The Limited Future of Unlimited Liability: A Capital Markets Perspective by Grundfest, Joseph A
Articles
The Limited Future of Unlimited Liability:
A Capital Markets Perspective
Joseph A. Grundfestt
INTRODUCTION
Traditional arguments in favor of limited liability for corporate shareholders
have come under fire.' Under the doctrine of limited liability, if a judgment
is rendered against a corporation in an amount that exceeds its ability to pay,
judgment creditors cannot pursue the corporation's shareholders to collect the
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residual amount. Critics claim that this limitation on liability provides an
incentive for excessive corporate risk-taking and unfairly limits recoveries by
plaintiffs with valid claims, particularly victims of corporate torts.2 This
disenchantment has spawned a search for alternative liability regimes, and the
search seems to have settled on proportionate liability as the most plausible
substitute for the traditional limited liability rule.3
Under a proportionate liability rule, if a corporation lacks sufficient assets
to satisfy third-party claims, claimants have the right to recover from each
shareholder an amount proportionate to that shareholder's equity interest in the
enterprise. For example, if a corporation is found liable for $1.2 billion in tort
damages but has assets of only $200 million, an owner of one percent of the
corporation's shares would be liable for one percent of the residual $1 billion
claim, or $10 million. In contrast, the traditional limited liability rule protects
shareholders from any liability for damages that cannot be recovered from
corporate coffers, as long as there are no special circumstances that warrant
"piercing the corporate veil." 4
The asserted benefit of proportionate liability as applied to large publicly
traded corporations 5 is that it will cause stock prices to decline by amounts that
reflect the perceived magnitude and probability of events that might expose
shareholders to claims in excess of corporate assets.6 This decline in stock
2. See, e.g., Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 1880-81; Leebron, supra note 1, at 1568. Advocates
of limited liability recognize that these problems arise but argue that the benefits of limited liability generally
exceed its costs. See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 14.5 (3d ed. 1986);
Easterbrook & Fischel, Limited Liability, supra note 1, at 93-103.
3. Most notably, Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman contend it is practical and desirable to abandon
limited liability and instead to hold shareholders proportionately liable for claims that exceed corporate assets.
They take issue with the dominant defense of limited liability, a critique of the informational requirements
inherent in a joint and several liability rule, by arguing that none of these impediments applies to a rule
of proportionate liability. "If there remain reasons for retaining the limited liability regime," Hansmann and
Kraakman conclude, "the burden is on the proponents of that regime to provide a persuasive exposition of
those reasons." Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 1934. Hansmann and Kraakman recognize that
in the case of firms with liquid, publicly traded shares, "a workable rule would call for a number of
refinements." They assert, however, that "our preliminary sketch of a regime of unlimited liability suggests
many of the appropriate adaptations." Id. at 1933.
Leebron provides more tempered support for a proportionate liability regime. Although he concludes
that "[tlhe case for limited liability of investors for the tort liabilities of corporations has been seriously
overestimated," he recognizes administrative and diversification problems that can arise under a proportionate
liability regime. Leebron therefore suggests that definitive conclusions about the desirability of proportionate
liability for firms with publicly traded shares "must await further empirical and theoretical work on both
the efficiency costs of limited liability and the diversification effects and transaction costs of unlimited
liability." Leebron, supra note I, at 1649.
4. See generally STEPHEN B. PRESSER, PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL (1991).
5. The analysis in this Article is limited to corporations with actively traded shares that can support
the arbitrage transactions described below. Under current market conditions, these equities are likely to be
publicly traded, but it is theoretically possible for private over-the-counter markets to develop sufficient
liquidity to sustain the arbitrage for issuers whose equity securities are not registered for trading in public
markets. See, e.g., SEC Agrees to Propose Rule Changes Expanding Shelf Registration, Rule 144A, 24 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1059 (July 17, 1992) (discussing potential for organized, liquid trading markets for
certain privately placed securities).
6. As Hansmann and Kraakman explain, "[i]f shareholders faced full liability for potential tort losses,
share prices would incorporate available information about the full extent of these possible losses." Hansmann
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prices, the reformers argue, will give corporate managers powerful incentives
to engage in less risky conduct or to purchase additional corporate insurance.7
In addition, shareholders will have an incentive to purchase "portfolio insurance"
to protect against their new financial exposure! The net result will be corporate
decisionmaking that more accurately internalizes the risks posed by corporate
conduct and leads corporations to adopt a higher, socially preferable standard
of care. Proponents also argue that such a scheme will yield more adequate and
equitable compensation to victims of corporate wrongs because a larger pool
of assets will potentially be available to satisfy judgments that exceed corporate
net worth.
Central to this argument is the assertion that proportionate liability will cause
stock prices to decline in a manner rationally related to the business risks and
capital adequacy, including insurance, of the underlying enterprise.9 If stock
prices fail to respond as proponents predict, and additional assets do not become
available for third-party claimants, then this link in the logical chain is broken.
The argument that corporations will adopt a higher standard of care or purchase
more insurance then unravels, as does the assertion that victims will be more
adequately compensated. In other words, if capital markets fail to behave in
the straightforward fashion assumed by proponents of proportionate liability,
proportionate liability will not generate its intended benefits.
Proponents of proportionate liability have not, however, carefully examined
the capital market's likely response to this legal regime. Capital markets are
highly dynamic institutions. 0 They can respond to proportionate liability by
strategically generating a large clientele of investors who are de facto attachment-
proof in actions seeking recovery of proportionate damages." These attachment-
proof investors can specialize in holding equity that is susceptible to third party
claims under a proportionate liability regime. Meanwhile, potentially attachable
& Kraakman, supra note I, at 1907. As a result, they claim, "[t]here is no doubt that unlimited
liability... would ncrease the cost of equity. Indeed, the purpose of unlimited liability is to make share
prices reflect tort costs." Id. at 1903. For his part, Leebron claims that"[a]doption of unlimited liability would
have fairly precise financial consequences, to which investors could be expected to respond in rational and
measured fashion." Leebron, supra note 1, at 1570. The advocates of proportionate liability entertain no
doubts that their reform would cause predictable declines in the price of certain stocks.
7. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 1907-09.
8. This insurance would be offered to shareholders "to supplement the liability insurance carried by
public corporations directly." Id. at 1901. This form of portfolio insurance should be distinguished from
dynamic hedging strategies known by the same name, under which investors replicate put options by selling
futures contracts or shares of stock when market prices decline. These dynamic hedging strategies were,
fairly or not, blamed for contributing to the stock market crash on October 19, 1987. See, e.g., DARRYL
DUFFIE, FUTURES MARKETS 157-61, 290-96 (1989).
9. Leebron provides a detailed summary of the standard analysis used by proportionate liability advocates
to suggest that stock prices will decline in a manner rationally related to the corporation's risks and assets.
Leebron, supra note I, at 1569-74.
10. See, e.g., John D. Finnerty, An Overview of Corporate Securities Innovation, 4 J. APPLIED CORP.
FIN. 23 (1992); Merton H. Miller, Financial Innovation: The Last Twenty Years and the Next, 21 J. FIN.
& QUANTTTATIVE ANALYsIs 459 (1986).
11. See infra Part I(B).
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shareholders can specialize in holding equity that is relatively unlikely to generate
proportionate liability exposure. Transactions in the futures, options, or swap
markets can then reallocate equity market risk and return without shifting propor-
tionate liability exposure, and thereby leave stock prices unchanged from prices
that would prevail in a limited liability world.
The net result of this capital market activity would be a series of transactions
arbitraging away the price effects of proportionate liability so as to yield the
prices that would have prevailed under traditional limited liability. These
arbitrage transactions would remove the price signals upon which reformers rely,
insulate shareholders from any additional financial risk resulting from adoption
of proportionate liability, and lead to no increase in the pool of assets potentially
available to plaintiffs with claims in excess of corporate assets. Thus, a propor-
tionate liability regime will be able to influence capital market prices only to
the extent that transaction costs inhibit arbitrage transactions that synthesize
limited liability pricing. The stock price effect of a proportionate liability rule
can therefore never be greater than the transaction cost of the cheapest arbitrage
that avoids liability generated by the rule.12
The implications of this analysis are not limited to the infeasibility of
proportionate liability as a specific substitute for limited liability. Any shareholder
liability rule that deviates from the currently dominant limited liability regime
is subject to capital market arbitrage of the sort described in this Article. The
focus on proportionate liability merely illustrates how such arbitrage functions.
The argument presented here is thus a generic and pragmatic defense of limited
liability against alternative regimes. Even if everyone agrees that reasons of
equity or efficiency make it desirable to abandon limited liability, we cannot
achieve that result for firms with liquid equity traded in a world with innovative
capital markets and minimal transaction costs.
This Article also has broad implications for policy efforts to regulate
economic behavior by influencing capital market prices. The analysis suggests
that, because of the high degree of substitutability and low transaction costs that
characterize modem capital markets, efforts to regulate behavior through the
12. The analysis in this paper assumes that the transaction costs of the arbitrage described herein are
de minimis and also less than the stock price decline that would follow adoption of proportionate liability.
Even if transaction costs are assumed to be substantial, the markets will be able to arbitrage away the effects
of proportionate liability to the extent that transaction costs are lower than the private costs imposed by
proportionate liability. Capital markets will respond as proponents of proportionate liability predict only
if, and only to the extent that, arbitrage costs are greater than the private costs imposed by proportionate
liability. Obviously, there are no empirical data quantifying the equity market price effects of a shift to a
proportionate liability regime or the costs of arbitrage transactions that can avoid those price effects. But
in light of the rapid innovation and intemationalization of U.S. equity markets, see Finnerty, supra note
10; Joseph A. Grundfest, Internationalization of the World's Securities Markets: Economic Causes and
Regulatory Consequences, 4 J. FIN. SERVIcES REs. 349 (1990); Miller, supra note 10, even the most ardent
advocates of proportionate liability cannot simply assert that capital markets will respond as they predict




manipulation of financial market prices are often misguided and will generally
fail to achieve their desired purposes.
Part I of this Article describes how modem financial markets can respond
to proportionate liability with arbitrage transactions that leave the market price
of publicly traded equities unchanged despite the shift to proportionate liability.
These equilibria effectively synthesize limited liability pricing in a proportionate
liability regime.
Corporations can help preserve limited liability pricing by reducing the float
of equity potentially subject to proportionate liability claims. Corporations also
can issue instruments priced as though they are limited liability equity but not
treated as equity for legal purposes. Part II describes this corporate balance sheet
response and its role in the arbitrage. In addition, intermediaries can, independent
of any decision by corporate issuers, create equity-like instruments that are not
subject to proportionate liability and thereby expand the pool of assets that can
be invested in equity without becoming exposed to proportionate liability. Part
III describes the role intermediaries can play in the arbitrage.
Part IV addresses the possibility that drafters of a proportionate liability
rule will attempt to craft the rule broadly to prevent capital markets from
synthesizing prices that would prevail under a limited liability rule. The analysis
suggests that these rules would be difficult to design in theory and impossible
to implement in practice. Prior attempts to discover such regulatory El Dorados
have invariably ended in frustration and expense, and there is no reason to
believe that this expedition would meet a happier fate. Part IV thereby argues
that there is no such thing as a simple proportionate liability rule, and that any
attempt to adopt such a rule would have to be accompanied by an armamen-
tarium of collateral capital and product market regulations that would prove
unwieldy, expensive, and unenforceable. 13
More fundamentally, this Article illustrates a profound difference between
modem capital markets and traditional markets for goods and services. Modem
financial markets cross national borders with ease. Chameleon-like, they can
generate novel instruments and transactions that capitalize on changes in legal
regimes. To assume that capital markets will not respond to changes in tax
regimes or liability rules by substituting away from penalized transactions is
to assume a world that no longer exists. Part V suggests that we must employ
great care in designing strategies that would influence economic behavior by
forcing changes in the value of financial instruments. Given the structure of
modem capital markets, strategies that affect the value of underlying productive
13. Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman simply prove this point in their response following this
Article. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Do the Capital Markets Compel Limited Liability? A
Response to Professor Grundfest, 102 YALE L. 427 (1992). To prevent the arbitrage transactions described
in this Article, Hansmann and Kraakman suggest a companion set of complex restrictions on international
capital flows that would prove impossible to implement and would add further costs to a proportionate liability
regime.
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activities are more effective than strategies that seek to influence or tax capital
market transactions.
Finally, this Article concludes that advocates of proportionate liability are
correct to criticize traditional arguments in favor of limited liability, but that
proportionate liability is neither a practical nor a theoretically superior alternative
for publicly traded corporations. To the extent that publicly traded corporations
engage in excessive risk-taking because limited liability provides them with a
shield, other policy tools-such as mandatory insurance, product safety
requirements, and "gatekeeper" liability-are likely to be more equitable and
effective. Capital markets cannot arbitrage away the incentives created by these
rules, nor can foreign manufacturers or investors operating under different
corporate liability regimes evade them as easily. These alternative strategies are
therefore more likely to resolve the problems that limited liability cre-
ates-assuming that the problems are, in the first instance, large enough to
warrant the costs and imperfections of intervention.
I. CAPITAL MARKET ARBITRAGE AND THE IRRELEVANCE OF
PROPORTIONATE LIABILITY
The assumption that stock prices will decline to reflect the perceived
probability and magnitude of events triggering liability in excess of corporate
assets is central to the argument that proportionate liability will induce corpora-
tions to internalize costs that limited liability now enables them to avoid. It may
be wrong, however, to assume this simple cause and effect relationship. If stock
prices fail to decline in response to a shift to proportionate liability, there will
be no price signal to trigger additional corporate risk avoidance or increased
corporate insurance coverage.
At first blush, it seems counterintuitive to suggest that equity prices might
not even flutter if proportionate liability becomes the law of the land. After all,
equity prices are supposed to reflect a rational assessment of the likely returns
from holding a security. 14 If investors suddenly confront the possibility that
stock ownership might create a liability, it seems reasonable to expect that they
will demand additional returns to compensate for the new risk. By this logic,
prices will have to decline to provide this increased return, which is precisely
the effect that proponents of proportionate liability desire.1 5 Indeed, the vast
event study literature would seem to support the conclusion that adoption of
proportionate liability would result in the decline of certain stock prices. 6
14. Leebron, supra note 1, at 1569-74.
15. See, e.g., Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note I, at 1903.
16. See Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: II, 46 J. FIN. 1575, 1599-1602 (1991) (reviewing




This argument, however, implicitly assumes that proportionate liability will
not cause the emergence of a "clientele effect" in which a large and well-
capitalized pool of de facto attachment-proof shareholders specialize in holding
the equity of "risky" firms' 7 that might generate proportionate liability exposure.
Investors who are not de facto attachment-proof would, in contrast, specialize
in holding the shares of "safe" firms that are unlikely to generate such exposure.
The result is a separating equilibrium in which no investor whose assets can
be reached under a proportionate liability regime holds shares that could expose
her to that risk. Transactions in the futures, options, and swaps markets could
then rebalance investor portfolios without exposing any investor to proportionate
liability. In the end, transaction costs in the capital markets might increase, but
stock market prices would not fall to reflect the risks associated with propor-
tionate liability.1
8
Clientele effects of this sort, along with their related separating equilibria,
are not unusual in modem capital markets. The literature documents tax
clienteles, dividend clienteles, and leverage clienteles in which some investors
specialize in holding instruments that other investors specifically avoid.' 9 These
clientele effects can be large, intricate and exotic, and easily cross national
borders.
Through the late 1980's in Japan, for example, government regulators
required Japanese insurers who had contracted to make annual payments to whole
17. "Risk" in this sense refers to the possibility of an event that causes shareholder liability under a
proportionate liability rule. This proportionate liability risk should be distinguished from "risk" in its more
usual meaning, which refers to the expected volatility of an investment's return, measured by variance or
other higher moments of the probability distribution that describes the rewards of holding the security. See,
e.g., EDWIN J. ELTON & MARTIN J. GRUBER, MODERN PORTFOLIO THEORY AND INVESTMENT ANALYSIS
98-99 (4th ed. 1991). The assumption that firms can be sorted into two categories of "risky" and "safe"
enterprises is made solely for simplicity. Firms could also be ranked along a continuum of riskiness with
the equity of riskier firms threatening to decline more in price and thereby being even more susceptible to
market arbitrage.
18. Stock prices would fall only to the extent of the transaction costs inherent in the arbitrage that avoids
liability. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
19. See, e.g., Jaime C. Dermody & Eliezer Z. Prisman, Term Structure Multiplicity and Clientele in
Markets with Transactions Costs and Taxes, 43 J. FIN. 893 (1988) (demonstrating possibility of multiple
equilibria with strong clientele effects in the presence of transaction costs and taxes); Edwin J. Elton & Martin
J. Gruber, Marginal Stockholder Tax Rates and the Clientele Effect, 52 REV. ECON. & STAT. 68 (1970)
(exploring clientele effects that relate marginal shareholder tax brackets to corporate dividend policies); John
M. Harris, Jr. et al., Evidence of Financial Leverage Clienteles, 38 J. FIN. 1125 (1983) (finding strong
correlation between shareholder tax rates and financial leverage of firms with high debt-equity ratios); Wilbur
G. Lewellen et al., Some Direct Evidence on the Dividend Clientele Phenomenon, 33 J. FIN. 1385 (1978)
(displaying direct evidence of clientele effects); Robert H. Litzenberger & Krishna Ramaswamy, The Effects
of Dividends on Common Stock Prices: Tax Effects or Information Effects?, 37 J. FIN. 429 (1982) (finding
that common stock dividend yields suggest existence of tax-induced clienteles); Robert H. Litzenberger &
Krishna Ramaswamy, The Effect of Personal Taxes and Dividends on Capital Asset Prices: Theory and
Empirical Evidence, 7 J. FIN. ECON. 163 (1979) (attributing correlation between dividend yield and returns
on common stock to taxation effects); R. Richardson Pettit, Taxes, Transactions Costs and the Clientele
Effect of Dividends, 5 . FIN. EcoN. 419 (1977) (attributing variability in dividend yields to tax effects and
differences in time preferences).
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life insurance policyholders to make those payments from current income,
defined as the sum of dividends and interest z° The regulations prohibited
insurers from using capital gains to make these payments. It would seem that
this requirement could provide an incentive for Japanese insurers to hold high-
dividend-paying shares which might affect pricing in Japanese equity markets.
Japanese insurers, however, regularly avoided this consequence of domestic
insurance regulation by purchasing large blocks of high-yield U.S. equities cum
dividend (i.e., with the right to receive the dividend) and immediately reselling
those blocks ex dividend (i.e., without the right to receive the dividend).2 A
tax-exempt U.S. entity, indifferent between recognizing capital gains or dividend
income, was the typical counterparty in these trades. Although the capital gains
realized by the U.S. tax-exempt institution were approximately equal to the
dividends foregone, the U.S. entity had an incentive to engage in the trade
because the capital gains were recognized immediately, whereas the dividend
would typically be received five weeks after the ex dividend date.
These Japanese insurance regulations generated billions of dollars in U.S.
equity market transactions. Remarkably, dividend arbitrage trading of this sort
accounted for more than twelve percent of average daily trading volume on the
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) in the second and third quarters of 1988.22
It constituted twenty-five percent or more of NYSE volume on some days.23
This arbitrage activity has declined in recent years because Japanese authorities
have amended their insurance regulations to eliminate insurers' incentives to
engage in these dividend-stripping transactions.2
20. Jennifer Lynch Koski, Nonstandard Settlement Trading On Ex-Dividend Days 8 (Jan. 1992)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
21. For example, suppose a stock pays a dividend of$I every quarter. Immediately prior to the dividend
record date, the stock trades at $ 100 per share cum dividend. Once the record date passes, purchasers acquire
the share ex dividend, without the right to the $1 dividend, even though the dividend is not actually paid
until about five weeks after the record date. To simplify, assume that this stock's price is stable over time
at $100 cum dividend and approximately $99 ex dividend. If a tax-exempt U.S. shareholder is able to sell
this stock for $100 cum dividend every quarter and then immediately repurchase it ex dividend for $99, she
earns $1 per quarter in capital gains. Yet that investor remains a continuous holder of the issuer's
shares-except for the instant when the stock passes from cum dividend status to ex dividend status. If a
Japanese insurance company stands on the other side of each transaction and buys the stock for $100 cum
dividend and immediately resells it to the tax exempt institution for $99 ex dividend, it can report receipt
of a $1 dividend which is offset by a $1 capital loss on the purchase and sale of the underlying shares.
The net financial effect of the transaction is zero, but a dollar of capital loss in the U.S. exempt
taxpayer's account has been transformed into a dollar of Japanese insurer dividend income that can be used
to make payments to Japanese whole life policyholders. Reports suggest that in 1987 the College Retirement
Equities Fund earned an additional $11.7 million through such trading. George Anders, Seizing Stocks:
Japanese Players Grab Big Dividend Income in Latest Market Ploy, WALL ST. J., May 20, 1988, at Al.
For descriptions of more intricate dividend capture strategies, see Beatrice E. Garcia, Trading to Nab Dividends
Captures Investors' Fancy, WALL ST. J., May 19, 1986, at A23, and Scott McMurray, Risky Dividend-Capture
Strategy Entails Buying 7 Issues and Selling Index Futures, WALL ST. J., Apr. 27, 1987, at B40.
22. Anders, supra note 21.
23. On May 16, 1988, dividend capture trading in GTE stock alone accounted for 48 million of the
155 million shares traded on the NYSE that day, or 31% of NYSE volume. Id.
24. William Power & Michael R. Sesit, Mania for Dividend Captures Subsides, WALL ST. J., May 12,
1989, at Cl. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 13, at 434 n.21, suggest that Japanese regulators could




Just as capital markets were able to arbitrage away the effects of Japanese
insurance regulations through tens of billions of dollars worth of trades on the
NYSE, they will be able to do the same for proportionate liability if this new
regime threatens to have a meaningful impact on equity prices. For the market
to avoid the price consequences of proportionate liability through arbitrage, a
class of shareholders must evolve having substantial investable wealth without
having assets that plaintiffs could reach under a regime of proportionate liability.
Such a clientele is likely to emerge because of the constitutional and practical
problems that would arise from efforts to collect proportionate liability judgments
from domestic or foreign shareholders of firms lacking the assets to satisfy judg-
ments.
A proportionate liability regime can be adopted at either the state or the
federal level?8 If proportionate liability is adopted at the state level, constitu-
tional limitations would severely restrict the ability of state courts and federal
courts, sitting in diversity jurisdiction, to assert jurisdiction over out-of-state
shareholder defendants in proportionate liability actions. As Professor Janet
Cooper Alexander cogently explains, the simple passive ownership of stock in
a corporation that commits a tort cannot satisfy the minimum contacts test for
assertion of jurisdiction. This holds true even if the tort occurs in the forum
state,26 the corporation is incorporated in the forum state,27 and the sharehold-
ers derive economic benefit from the corporation's activity in the forum state. 28
transactions. The requirement that annual payments be made from current income is not, however, a capital
requirement because it does not require that the insurer maintain any particular amount of capital. It is, instead,
a restriction on the size of aggregate payments that is keyed to the size of dividend and interest income.
As such, the restriction has nothing to do with capitalization requirements because an insurer can be either
over or undercapitalized while paying out more or less than its dividend and interest income. Contrary to
Hansmann and Kraakman's suggestion, the Japanese dividend recapture experience thus implies nothing
about the futility of net capital requirements that actually require the possession of positive net assets. As
for regulatory strategies that could have made recapture transactions impractical, it is certainly possible to
speculate endlessly about such techniques, but Hansmann and Kraakman's suggestion that a six-month holding
period would prevent avoidance of the rule is incorrect. Insurers would then not rely on dividend recapture
strategies but could, instead, specialize in holding the shares of high-yielding stocks and swap out equity
returns with other investors, thereby achieving the same results with possibly higher transaction costs. See
infra Part I(E); see also Robert H. Litzenberger, Swaps: Plain and Fanciful, 47 J. FIN. 831, 843-44 (1992)
(describing recent transactions in which Japanese insurers have turned to swap market to generate additional
current income). No doubt, new rules could be written to strengthen the restriction, and new transactions
could be invented to work around these new rules. See infra Part IV. Japanese authorities, however, adopted
a wiser path. Rather than add new regulatory restrictions to defend a rule that is difficult to enforce and
serves little legitimate purpose in modem markets, they effectively eliminated the need to engage in this
fundamentally pointless financial engineering.
25. Hansmann and Kraakman argue that proportionate liability should be adopted at the state level.
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 1921-22. Other commentators do not address this question and
appear to assume that proportionate liability can be adopted at the federal level.
26. Janet Cooper Alexander, Unlimited Shareholder Liability through a Procedural Lens, 106 HARV.
L. REV. (forthcoming Dec. 1992).
27. Id.
28. Id. (citing World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1977)).
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For jurisdiction to lie, the corporation's shareholders would probably have to
be subject to personal service in the forum state, reside in the state, engage in
continuous and substantial business dealings in the state, or have litigation-related
contacts with the forum state.29 Because of these constitutional limitations, only
a fraction of any corporation's shareholders would be subject to excess liability
in any given state, and that fraction would depend on random factors, such as
the locus of the specific tort at issue and the residences of each of the corpora-
tion's shareholders. ° Moreover, because it would be against a state's self-
interest to make its residents liable for torts while residents of other states could
readily avoid jurisdiction, the prospect that proportionate liability would be
adopted at the state level seems doubtful.31
Although a federal proportionate liability statute could likely avoid these
constitutional impediments, it would not enable U.S. courts to assert jurisdiction
over foreign shareholders and it could not overcome a variety of practical
problems that plaintiffs would encounter when seeking to collect proportionate
liability judgments.32 Even if plaintiffs were able to obtain a judgment against
a corporation for an amount in excess of the corporation's assets, multiple
collection proceedings would be necessary to pursue domestic shareholders for
their proportionate liability. Domestic shareholders who were not parties to the
original action might also seek to relitigate the tort liability issues in the context
of any enforcement action.33 If domestic shareholders defaulted in these
proceedings, the plaintiffs would have to pursue individual shareholders to collect
on the default judgments. These lawsuits would be numerous and costly,34 and
even the strongest proponents of proportionate liability recognize that "it is
expensive to foreclose on a large class of small guarantors in case of default."35
In particular, although some estimates indicate that institutional shareholders
hold about half of the equity value of publicly traded U.S. corporations,36 many
of these holdings are nevertheless quite small in percentage terms. Relatively




32. Id; see Lea Brilmayer & Charles Norchi, Federal Extraterritoriality and Fifth Amendment Due
Process, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1217 (1992).
33. Alexander, supra note 26.
34. Id.
35. Henry Hansmann, Ownership ofthe Firm, 4 L L. ECON. & ORG. 267,282 (1988) (citation omitted).
36. CENTER FOR LAW AND ECONOMIC STUDIES, COLUMBIA UNVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, INSTITTIONAL
INVESTORS AND CAPITAL MARKETS: 1991 UPDATE (1991) (Table 10) (finding that as of year-end 1990 public
and private pension funds, bank trusts, mutual funds, insurance companies, foundations, and endowments
owned 53.3% of equity in U.S. corporations).
37. "Holdings are highly concentrated in the largest institutions," and after considering the holdings
of the largest twenty institutional investors, "concentration in institutional ownership falls off dramatically."
Carolyn Kay Brancato, Institutional Investor Concentration of Economic Power: A Study of Institutional
Holdings and Voting Authority in U.S. Publicly Held Corporations 7, 8 (Oct. 1991) (Part I: Top 25 U.S.
Corporations as of December, 1990), in Shareholder Rights: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Securities
of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. 287-88 (1991).
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calculations have found households "the largest single direct holders of equities,"
owning approximately $2.3 trillion, or fifty-three percent, of equity securities
valued as of year-end 1990.38 The median value of portfolios held by America's
51.4 million shareholders is $11,400 with an average of 3.2 issues per port-
folio.39 For small individual and institutional holdings, even proponents of
proportionate liability recognize that collection efforts would not be worthwhile
for many plaintiffs.4 Shareholders with sufficiently small holdings, whether
individual or institutional, are therefore naturally immune to the potential risks
of proportionate liability. In addition, if the incentives were sufficiently powerful,
the market could easily reallocate holdings in risky issues from larger to smaller
positions, thereby placing a greater portion of a corporation's shares beyond
any plaintiff's practical reach.41
The problem of collecting proportionate liability judgments from smaller
domestic shareholders pales in comparison to the challenge of asserting juris-
diction over foreign shareholders of U.S. corporations and then attaching their
assets. The Supreme Court has made it substantially more difficult to acquire
jurisdiction over foreign defendants than over U.S. citizens. Even when the
constitutional requirement of minimum contacts is satisfied-a finding that will
be difficult to support for many foreigners who are merely passive share-
holders-the Court has looked to principles of international comity before
asserting jurisdiction over foreigners.42 The Court has warned that "[gireat care
and reserve should be exercised when extending our notions of personal
38. Jeffrey M. Schaefer et al., 1991-The Start of a New Era? The Flow of Funds: 1980-91, 28 SEC.
INDUs. TRENDS 1 (1992).
39. NEw YORK STOCK EXCHANG3E SHAREOWNERSHIP 19 (1990).
40. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note I, at 1900; Leebron, supra note 1, at 1611.
41. In arguing that proportionate liability could effectively reach many shareholders, Hansmann and
Kraakman reason by analogy to the "double liability" system prevailing in the banking system between the
Civil War and the Great Depression. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 13, at 431 n.12. Under thatsystem,
the receiver of a failed bank would assess shareholders "for an amount up to and including the par value
of their stock." Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Double Liability of Bank Shareholders: History
and Implications, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 31, 31 (1992). If that system succeeded, they argue, then
proportionate liability could also succeed.
The double liability banking system, however, existed at a time when capital markets were far less
developed, and shares were held by much smaller numbers of holders who often tended to reside in the
local community. Even so, only "about half the assessed amounts were collected." Id. at 34. Further, much
of the success of the double liability system was attributable to the fact that bank managers, who also owned
substantial amounts of bank stock, "apparently wished to wind up the affairs of their institutions before
insolvency in order to avoid assessment" Id. But if modem corporate managers have relatively small holdings,
as is often the case, the incentive for care in modem markets would be weaker than it was in the banking
industry earlier this century. The direct threat of financial loss to managers as a result of assessment is also
more akin to a "gatekeeper" strategy in which management is forced to pay a penalty in the event of
insolvency. See infra text accompanying notes 140-144. Thus, whatever the historic success of double liability
in the banking system, it is a weak analogy at best for proportionate liability in modem capital markets
involving millions of shareholders in domestic as well as foreign transactions.
42. Alexander, supra note 26.
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jurisdiction into the international field."43 Thus, the prospects for asserting
jurisdiction over foreign shareholders are not encouraging.
Even if jurisdiction over a foreign shareholder could be established, however,
enforcing a judgment against her could prove an impossible task. Simply
identifying foreign shareholders and locating their assets can be daunting. 4
Moreover, there is reason to believe that foreign courts might not enforce U.S.
judgments abroad. Some countries may not recognize default judgments; some
will only enforce a foreign judgment that is consistent with the judgment that
would have resulted under their own choice of law rules; and some reserve the
right to review the merits of foreign judgments. 45 In addition, the cost of
pursuing shareholders abroad will be substantially greater than the cost of
pursuing domestic shareholders.
The challenges created by foreign shareownership should not be minimized,
particularly in today's highly internationalized capital markets. Recent data
establish that foreigners are able quickly to increase their holdings of U.S.
equities just as U.S. investors are able easily to move their investments abroad.
In 1989, aggregate foreign purchases and sales of securities in U.S. markets
amounted to $416.3 billion.' These investment flows grew at a cumulative
average annual growth rate of 21.0% through the 1980's, causing the volume
of international securities transactions in U.S. markets to more than quintuple
from its 1980 level of $75.1 billion.47 U.S. transactions in foreign securities
43. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 115 (1987) (quoting United States v. First
Nat'l City Bank, 379 U.S. 378, 404 (1965) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
44. Identifying foreign owners can be virtually impossible when ownership must be traced through
bearer shares, such as those issued by Liechtenstein Anstalts, or when ownership is held through accounts
in jurisdictions with bank secrecy laws. See, e.g., INGO WALTER, THE SECRET MONEY MARKET 185-237
(1990) (emphasizing use of secrecy jurisdictions as means of avoiding detection and enforcement); Marc
C. Corrado, Comment, The Supreme Court's Impact on Swiss Banking Secrecy: Societe Nationale Industrielle
Aerospatialle v. United States District Court, 37 A14. U. L. REv. 827, 829-31 (1988) (reviewing Swiss
domestic policy rationales for bank secrecy); Michael Getler, Europe's Ultimate Tax Haven, WASH. POST,
Jan. 15, 1978, at 115; Liechtenstein; Coming Clean, ECONOMIST, Apr. 26, 1980, at 59; Steve Lohr, Where
the Money Washes Up, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1992, at 27 (Magazine); John Wicks, A Tax Haven Where
Companies Outnumber the Population, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 24, 1984, at 8. To deal with the challenges posed
by foreign ownership and trading, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission has negotiated an intricate
web of treaties and memoranda of understanding. See, e.g., Richard M. Phillips & Gilbert C. Miller, The
Internationalization of Securities Fraud Enforcement in the 1990s, 25 REV. SEC. & COMMODITIES REG.
119 (1992). It is highly doubtful that foreign jurisdictions would be as accommodating to U.S. enforcement
efforts seeking to expose a potentially large number of passive foreign shareholders to liability as they are
when U.S. authorities pursue only a small number of foreign investors based on evidence of direct individual
wrongdoing in U.S. securities markets.
It is also no easy matter to identify shareholders within the United States because of the widespread
use of nominees, trusts, and "street name" ownership. See, e.g., JAMES E. HEARD & HOWARD D. SHERMAN,
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN THE PROXY VOTING SYSTEM 74 (1987) ("Street name registration makes it difficult
for companies to identify who their beneficial owners are."); BETrY LINN KRIKORIAN, FIDUCIARY STANDARDS
IN PENSION AND TRUST FUND MANAGEMENT 92 (1989) ("Part of the difficulty in obtaining shareholder
information stems from the system.., of having securities held in nominee name in central securities
depositories.... Often these legal owners are not the beneficial owners of the stock."); see also 17 C.F.R.
§§ 240.14a-1, 240.15a-2 (1992).
45. Alexander, supra note 26.
46. Grundfest, supra note 12, at 353.
47. Id.
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markets grew at an even faster pace. In 1989, aggregate U.S. purchases and sales
of foreign securities amounted to $230.3 billion.' These investment flows grew
at a cumulative average annual growth rate of 32.8% through the 1980's, causing
the volume of U.S. transactions in international markets to increase more than
twelve-fold from its 1980 level of $17.9 billion'
Foreign capital would be able to enter U.S. markets quickly and easily to
take advantage of any opportunities created by the adoption of proportionate
liability, and domestic capital would be invested in foreign vehicles that purchase
domestic U.S. securities or are otherwise immune to proportionate liability
judgments. Each of these investment pools would be difficult or impossible for
plaintiffs to reach in their efforts to enforce proportionate liability judgments,
assuring the existence of a large and elastic class of investors who are attach-
ment-proof in U.S. proportionate liability proceedings.
C. An Example of Liability Arbitrage
The existence of a large and expandable pool of assets in the hands of
attachment-proof investors (also called "remote" investors because their assets
are, as a practical matter, out of the reach of proportionate liability claimants)
has profound implications for the viability of a proportionate liability rule. 0
Simply put, the presence of these investors means that the introduction of
proportionate liability may not change equity prices at all. If equity prices do
not change, corporate managers have no incentive to adopt a greater standard
of care and the efficiency rationale for the change to a proportionate liability
regime crumbles.
Capital markets can neutralize the price effects of proportionate liability
by combining a simple clientele effect with a series of derivative market
transactions. Consider, for example, an economy whose outstanding equity has
an aggregate market value of $1 trillion prior to the adoption of a proportionate
liability rule. Of this amount, $750 billion represents the equity market capital-
ization of firms for which there is no perceived ex ante risk of shareholders being
held proportionately liable. These safe firms might engage in relatively
nonhazardous activities, like software programming. Alternatively, they might
engage in dangerous activities, such as chemical manufacturing, but have assets
or insurance sufficiently large that shareholders perceive no additional risk from
holding these shares even under a proportionate liability regime. The remaining
48. Id. at 357.
49. Id.
50. The suggestion that "[u]nder a pro rata rule, shares would have the same expected value for all
shareholders," Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 1903, is central to the argument in favor of
proportionate liability. The presence of remote investors suggests that this assertion is incorrect because remote
investors have an incentive to value risky shares differently from investors who might be held proportionately
liable.
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$250 billion represents equity in risky firms for which there is a perceived danger
that shareholders might be held proportionately liable.51 Suppose also that
remote investors have equity market assets of at least $250 billion.52 The
remaining $750 billion of equity market valuation is held by attachable share-
holders whose assets can be reached for damage awards in proportionate liability
actions, if sufficient liability develops.
If the price of the $250 billion in equity securities issued by risky firms
begins to decline, remote investors will have an incentive to specialize in holding
these risky shares. After all, as the price of these securities declines, shareholders
will be able to purchase at discounts that do not expose them to proportionate
liability. In the extreme, these remote investors can hold all $250 billion worth
of equity in risky firms while assessable investors specialize in holding the $750
billion of equity in safe firms.
If all safe firms were otherwise identical to all risky firms then each portfolio
would replicate the other and the overall market. Under these special circum-
stances, no investor's portfolio would become unbalanced and stock prices would
not change if the legal rule shifted from limited to proportionate liability.
This is, however, an unrealistic scenario.53 Equity in safe issuers is likely
to differ systematically from equity in risky issuers because the firms are likely
to have very different economic characteristics. The strict separation of safe
equity in the hands of shareholders with attachable assets and risky equity in
the hands of remote shareholders will therefore cause both clienteles to find
themselves holding unbalanced portfolios. Remote investors who hold only risky
stocks in their portfolios will want to diversify by adding returns from safe stocks
while simultaneously reducing their risky stock exposure. Similarly, attachable
investors who have only safe stocks in their portfolios typically will want to
hold both safe and risky stocks, but without the proportionate liability exposure
that arises from holding shares in risky issuers. The problem, then, is how to
51. "Risky" here refers solely to the exposure that results from the adoption of proportionate liability
and not to elements of investment risk that also exist under limited liability regimes. See supra note 17.
52. This assumption is not strictly necessary. In a model with heterogeneous expectations, remote
investors could have assets less than the total market value of risky equity securities and, provided that they
remain the marginal shareholders at risky firms, market prices would not reflect any change as a result of
the adoption of proportionate liability. See infra Part Ill.
53. Hansmann and Kraakman suggest that a well-diversified portfolio can be created with only securities
of risky firms. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 13, at 429 n.7. The complement of this assertion is that
well-diversified portfolios can also be created with only securities of safe finns. Although the arbitrage
suggested in this Article would be even easier if this assertion is true, the assertion seems counterintuitive.
For example, chemical, petroleum, cigarette, and pharmaceutical firms are, as a class, more likely to fall
in the risky category than in the safe category. Elimination of these entire sectors from an equity portfolio
would unbalance it by excluding key cyclical firms, removing an element of oil price sensitivity, excluding
an historically stable source of cash flow from the cigarette industry, and eliminating opportunities to gain
from the development of new pharmaceutical technology. See, e.g., RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C.
MYERs, PRINCIPLEs OF CORPORATE FINANCE 172-73 (4th ed. 1991) (chemical companies have high sensitivity
to inflation, and elimination of chemical companies from assessable shareholders' portfolios would then
unbalance them with respect to inflation risk as well as to industry-specific risk).
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attain this diversification without upsetting the separation that prevents attachable
investors from holding risky shares.
Both clienteles can satisfy their diversification demands through futures,
swaps, and options transactions. These derivative market transactions can also
act as conduits for price information, so that even if the expectations of remote
shareholders differ significantly from the expectations of attachable shareholders,
final equilibrium market prices will reflect the aggregate expectations of all
market participants and will thereby replicate prices that would exist under
limited liability.54 Although the capital markets can craft a wide array of trans-
actions that can achieve this result, a discussion of simple futures, swaps, and
options transactions adequately illustrates the market's ability to shift risks so
that, through arbitrage, the price consequences of proportionate liability are
eliminated.
D. Rebalancing Through Futures Market Transactions
Futures markets can define contracts with values that are indexed to separate
portfolios of safe and risky shares.55 The holder of a futures contract indexed
to the value of a portfolio of risky shares holds no equity in the issuers whose
securities constitute the index.56 Accordingly, the holder of a futures contract
cannot be reached under a rule of proportionate liability.
Remote investors who have too many risky shares in their portfolios relative
to their desired equilibrium allocations can rebalance their initial portfolios by
purchasing futures contracts on a safe share index while simultaneously selling
futures contracts on a risky share index. Remote investors will thus simultan-
54. The suggestion that the market's ability to reconstruct balanced portfolios "is largely irrelevant,"
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 13, at 428, misses the point. By reconstructing balanced portfolios,
the market synthesizes pricing that would exist under a limited liability regime and thereby neutralizes any
incentive effects that might result from a shift to proportionate liability. If the markets did not have this
ability, then a shift to proportionate liability could have a price effect even if there existed a large class of
non-assessable shareholders.
55. Futures contracts are already available on a wide range of U.S. equity indexes, including the Standard
& Poor's 500, the Standard & Poor's Mid-Cap Index, the New York Stock Exchange Composite Index,
the Major Market Index, and the Value Line Index. Futures Prices, WALL ST. J., June 18, 1992, at C14.
Futures contracts can readily be created for other broad-based indexes, and also can be used to create global
synthetic index funds. See BRIAN BRUCE & ANNE EISENBERG, CHICAGO MERCANTILE EXCHANGE, THE CME
FINANCIAL STRATEGY PAPER: GLOBAL SYNTHETIC INDEX FUNDS (1992). However, futures contracts on
the shares of individual issuers are illegal in the United States. Thomas A. Russo & Marlisa Vinciguerra,
Financial Innovation and Uncertain Regulation: Selected Issues Regarding Product Development, 69 TEX.
L. REV. 1431, 1457 (1991) (The Commodities Exchange Act, § 2(a)(1)(A), 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1988), "prohibits
the offer or execution of futures contracts on individual securities, except individual securities that are
'exempted' and are not municipal securities," as defined in § 3 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77c (1988), and in § 3(a)(12) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(12) (1988)).
As a practical matter, this rule prohibits the trading of futures on individual equity securities in U.S. capital
markets. Id. Investors who want to use U.S. markets to shift proportionate liability risk in individual securities,
or in nonstandard portfolios on which futures are not traded, will have to engage in over-the-counter swap
or option contracts. See infra Part I(E)-(F).
56. Chicago Mercantile Exch. v. SEC, 883 F. 2d 537,545 (7th Cir. 1989) (futures are not equity interests
in shares that constitute the index), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 936 (1990).
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eously "go long" futures on the index of safe shares and "go short" the
equivalent value of futures on the index of risky shares. These simultaneous
transactions will reduce the remote investors' exposure to risky equity and
expand their exposure to safe equity, thereby duplicating the allocations that
would exist in a limited liability world while maintaining strict separation in
the equity market.
In contrast, attachable shareholders will rebalance their initial portfolios by
going long futures on the index of risky shares and going short the equivalent
value of futures on the index of safe shares. Through these derivative market
transactions, attachable shareholders will expand their exposure to risky shares
and reduce their exposure to safe shares, again maintaining strict separation in
the equity market and not exposing themselves to proportionate liability.
In this set of transactions, remote shareholders will want to buy the safe
share exposure that attachable shareholders want to sell. Remote shareholders
are natural longs for safe share futures while attachable shareholders are natural
shorts in the same market. Conversely, remote shareholders will want to sell
the risky share exposure that attachable shareholders want to buy, making remote
shareholders natural shorts for risky share futures and attachable shareholders
natural longs in the same market. Each party to the transaction is able to bargain
for the price she thinks each index is worth, and each clientele thereby conveys
its price expectations to the market segment in which it holds no shares.57
Adoption of a proportionate liability rule will thus have no price effect in the
market.
E. Rebalancing Through Swaps Market Transactions
In order to understand the simplest of equity market swap transactions,
consider a remote shareholder who holds a portfolio of risky shares and an
attachable shareholder who holds a portfolio of safe shares. These two investors
would be able to balance each other's portfolios and replicate the aggregate
market portfolio simply by entering into a swap arrangement whereby the remote
investor agrees to convey to the attachable investor the returns on a portion of
his risky portfolio. In return, the attachable investor agrees to convey the returns
on a portion of his safe portfolio to the remote investor. Investors do not have
to buy or sell stocks in this arrangement because they all agree to exchange a
portion of the net gains or losses that result from holding their respective
underlying equity positions58
57. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON MARKET MECHANISMS 55-57 (1988) (describing
mechanics of such price transmission). "[What may appear superficially to be three separate markets-for
stocks, stock options, and stock index futures-in fact behaves as one market." Id. at 55.
58. See Henry T. C. Hu, Swaps, The Modern Process of Financial Innovation and the Vulnerability




Thus, remote investors remain the sole owners of the risky shares and have
no incentive to discount the value of these shares. This arrangement allows all
investors to become fully diversified in the equity markets without exposing
any attachable investors to the risk of proportionate liability. Equilibrium prices
will again replicate prices under limited liability because, in both markets, all
investors hold balanced portfolios and no investor is subject to the additional
risk generated by proportionate liability.
The technology to support intricate swap transactions is commonplace
among institutional investors. The aggregate swap market has exploded from
a notional value of about $1 trillion in 1987 to an estimated $3-$5 trillion as
of early 1992.59 Equity swaps have already been arranged on the basis of the
Standard & Poor's 500 Index, the Tokyo Stock Price Index (TOPIX), the Nikkei
225, France's Chamare des Agents de Change (CAC) 240, Britain's Financial
Times Stock Exchange (FTSE) 100, the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) 300,
and other more specialized indexes.60 Estimates peg the equity swaps market
at $125 billion as of year-end 1991,6' and there are press reports of a single
$500 million Nikkei swap.62 In addition, when market forces indicate a demand
for swaps on indexes that do not yet exist, intermediaries quickly create indexes
to satisfy that demand.63 Equity swaps designed to reallocate the economic
characteristics of separate portfolios of safe and risky shares are already well
within the market's capabilities.
F. Rebalancing Through Options Market Transactions
Options markets can also be used to arbitrage around the effect of propor-
tionate liability.64 Investors can create shares of "synthetic stock" by properly
59. Daniel P. Cunningham, Interest Rate and Currency Swaps and Related Transactions, in SWAPS
AND OTHER DERIVATIVES IN 1992 at 9, 11-15 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No.
778, 1992); Tracy Corrigan, Techniques Find New Markets--Equity and Commodity Swaps, FIN. TIMES,
Mar. 19, 1992, at 38; william Glasgall & Bill Javetski, Swap Fever: Big Money, Big Risks, BUS. WK., June
1, 1992, at 102; David Greising et al., Has Chicago Lost Its Edge?, BUS. WK., Mar. 9, 1992, at 76.
60. Peter A. Abken, Beyond Plain Vanilla: A Taxonomy of Swaps, ECON. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1991, at
12, 26-27; Richard Metcalfe, Out of the Shadows, RISK, Oct. 1990, at 40-42.
61. Claire Makin, Hedging Your Derivatives Doubts, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR F., Dec. 1991, at 113.
62. Lillian Chew, Unpicking Haute Couture, RISK, Apr. 1992, at 21, 24.
63. See, e.g., Angelo A. Calvello, Synthetic Equity, INSTruInONAL INVESTOR F., Nov. 1991, at37 ("There
appears to be no limit to the structure or coverage one can get with synthetic equities: Name an index or
marketsector, denominate itin the currency of your choice, and pick a term; someone will construct aproduct
that meets your specifications."); Steven Dickson, PSA Ready to Unveil Municipal Swap Index at April
Conference, BOND BUYER, Feb. 5, 1992, at 5 (Public Securities Association has developed new municipal
index designed specifically for swap transactions to satisfy demand for more accurate pricing in municipal
bond swap market); Morgan Guaranty Grabs More Equity-Index Swaps Business With "AAA" Rating, SEC.
WK., Sept. 2, 1991, at 3 ("key to the success of equity-index swaps is the ability to customize these products,
often using... sub-indices, to meet the customer's needs").
64. Options can be written on indexes of portfolios of safe or risky shares or on individual safe or risky
shares.
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structuring the simultaneous purchase of a call option and sale of a put option.65
The value of these synthetic stock positions will equal the value of the under-
lying shares independent of any proportionate liability effect because holders
of synthetic equity are not shareholders in the issuer of the shares on which the
66Reoeioptions are Written. Remote investors can increase their exposure to safe
shares by purchasing synthetic safe securities composed of combined long call
and short put positions on safe shares. Meanwhile, attachable investors can go
long in the market for synthetic risky securities by taking long call and short
put positions on such shares. To shed exposure, remote investors will sell
synthetic risky securities by entering into short call/long put positions on risky
shares, while attachable investors will sell synthetic safe shares by entering into
short call/long put positions on safe shares.
In this options market, attachable and remote investors are again natural
longs and shorts for each others' positions because each set of investors wants
to sell precisely the sort of equity market exposure the other wants to buy. This
reciprocity suggests that the overall capital market equilibrium Will incorporate
the price information of both clienteles, and strict separation will be maintained
in the equity market because no attachable investor will hold risky shares. Thus,
equilibrium prices in this proportionate liability regime would again be identical
to those in a limited liability regime.
G. The Aggregate Effect of Arbitrage Activity
The total separation of risky shares in the hands of remote shareholders,
as just described, is a sufficient condition for capital markets to replicate limited
liability pricing in a proportionate liability world. The necessary condition for
replication is easier to satisfy: the marginal purchasers that set the market price
for risky shares must be remote investors. In that event, the presence of attach-
able infra-marginal holders of risky shares will not cause market prices to deviate
from the limited liability equilibrium because prices at the margin will continue
to be set by investors who have no reason to discount equity values to reflect
proportionate liability risk. 7
This condition is relatively easy to satisfy. If the populations of remote
shareholders and shareholders with attachable assets are assumed to have
identical distributions of heterogeneous expectations, remote shareholders will
systematically be willing to pay more for equity in risky firms, both at the
65. See, e.g., THOMAS E. COPELAND & J. FRED WESTON, FINANCIAL THEORY AND CORPORATE POLICY
245-48,322-24 (3d ed. 1988); JOHN C. Cox & MARK RUBINSTEIN, OPTIONS MARKETS 41-43 (1985); WILLIAM
F. SHARPE & GORDON J. ALEXANDER, INVESTMENTS 625-27 (4th ed. 1990).
66. The issuer of these options is typically a third party such as the Options Clearing Corporation. LOUIS
Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 251 (3d ed. 1983).
67. Attachable shareholders might place higher-than-market values on risky shares if, for example, they
had independent incentives to retain equity for antitakeover purposes, or because of tax considerations or
reasons related to employment by the issuer.
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margin and infra-marginally.68 Thus, if an attachable shareholder is the marginal
holder who sets the market price, that shareholder can be outbid by remote
shareholders with otherwise identical expectations. They can also be outbid by
attachable shareholders with identical expectations who simply shift their assets
to a nonattachable form.69
H1. THE CORPORATE ISSUERS' RESPONSE
The market has an even greater ability to achieve a synthetic, limited liability
equilibrium than has been described up to this point. As investors sort themselves
into attachable and remote clienteles, issuers will have an incentive to respond
to market signals by shrinking the pool of equity that is potentially subject to
proportionate liability because capital in that form will become relatively more
expensive. Similarly, market intermediaries can develop techniques for sterilizing
potential proportionate liability exposure associated with holding risky shares,
even if issuers do nothing to change the structure of their balance sheets. As
the market moves to a new separating equilibrium that replicates limited liability
pricing, the risky equity pool that must be segregated and held solely by remote
investors will shrink while the ability of all investors to hold equity in non-
attachable form expands.
Corporations' incentives and abilities to restructure their balance sheets in
response to a proportionate liability rule are relatively straightforward. Corpora-
tions seek to minimize their total cost of capital as measured by the blended
cost of debt and equity financing.70 To the extent that a shift from limited to
proportionate liability increases the cost of equity by depressing the value of
an issuer's shares, the corporation has an incentive to restructure its balance
sheet by substituting away from newly-expensive equity and raising capital in
forms that are immune to proportionate liability judgments.7' This balance-sheet
substitution can occur simultaneously with the emergence of a clientele effect,
and the extent to which the market uses one technique or the other to arbitrage
around proportionate liability will depend on the relative transaction costs.
Moreover, the greater the extent to which issuers restructure their balance sheets
to reduce the outstanding float of capital potentially subject to proportionate
68. This condition is satisfied because for every assessable shareholder with a given set of expectations
about the value of a risky issuer's shares, there will be an attachment-proof shareholder with essentially
identical expectations.
69. This can be accomplished, for example, by shifting from U.S. equities to foreign instruments that
represent claims on U.S. equities. See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 93.
70. See, e.g., BREALEY & MYERs, supra note 53, at 189-91.
71. Although early research suggested that aggregate firm value is independent of the firm's financing
decision, see Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the
Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261 (1958), more recent research recognizes that there is an optimal
debt-equity mix and that a decrease in the cost of debt will cause a shift in capitalization away from equity.
See, e.g., Sudipto Bhattacharya, Corporate Finance and the Legacy of Miller and Modigliani, 2 J. ECON.
PERSP. 135 (1988).
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liability claims, the easier it becomes for the market to synthesize limited liability
pricing because a smaller percentage of outstanding securities will have to be
isolated in the hands of attachment-proof investors in order to sustain the
separating equilibrium.
Corporations already issue many instruments that can easily be used to raise
capital without subjecting holders to a risk of proportionate liability. At the
simplest level, corporations can issue additional debt in lieu of new equity or
use the proceeds of a debt offering to repurchase outstanding equity shares. The
debt can take the form of bank loans, bond issuances, or commercial funding
through accounts payable, factoring of receivables, or other sources.72 As the
corporation's debt-to-equity ratio increases, the corporation's junior debt will
become increasingly risky and its pricing will come closer to the pricing of the
issuer's equity shares.73
Finns can also issue more complex financial instruments that are not equity
for legal purposes though they are priced for financial purposes as though they
have a significant equity component. A convertible bond, for example, is treated
as "pure debt until conversion, after which it becomes an equity interest."74
The issuer can make the prices of these bonds track the value of the issuer's
equity more closely by reducing the price at which holders would want to
convert into equity and by minimizing the differential between the bond's interest
rate and the dividend paid on the equity into which the bond is convertible.75
The market for convertible debt is already quite substantial, with more than $57
billion outstanding as of March 1990.76 An additional $16.4 billion was issued
in 1991 alone.77
72. There is little doubt that corporate balance sheets respond to changes in the relative prices of debt
and equity. Between 1984 and 1989, debt was substituted for equity at a furious pace, primarily because
of tax-related incentives. During that period, net new equity issues declined at a rate of $95.8 billion per
year, with a reduction of $130 billion in 1989 alone. Myron S. Scholes, Stock and Compensation, 46 J. FIN.
803, 806-07 (1991).
73. See generally FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF BOSTON, ARE THE DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN DEBT AND
EQUITY DISAPPEARING? (Richard W. Kopcke & Eric S. Rosengren eds., 1989).
74. BORIS I. B1TrKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE, FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 4.06 (1980). Holders of convertible bonds have debt claims on the
corporations that are governed by the terms of the indenture. These investors step into the shoes of equity-
holders, to whom corporate boards owe full fiduciary duties, only upon conversion. See Broad v. Rockwell
Int'l Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 958 (5th Cir. 1981) (compliance with terms of indenture discharges corporation's
fiduciary duties to holders of convertible bonds), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981); Simons v. Cogan, 542
A.2d 785, 788-91 (Del. Ch. 1987) (holders of corporation's convertible debt are not beneficiaries of fiduciary
duties), aft'd, 549 A.2d 300 (Del. 1988).
75. If the equity features of convertible debt become too prominent, the taxing authorities may attempt
to recharacterize the convertible debt as equity. CECIL WRAY, JR. & SUZANNE VEILLEUX, INNOVATIVE
CORPORATE FINANCING TECHNIQUES A-12 (BNA Corp. Practice Series No. 48, 1986). For a discussion of
the debt-equity characterization problem as it relates to proportionate liability, see infra text accompanying
notes 105-110.
76. Kirby Freeman, US. Corporate Finance-Convertible vs. Junk Debt, REUTERS, Mar. 20, 1990,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters File.
77. Vineeta Anand, Convertible Issuance Soars As Rates Fall, Stocks Rise, INVESTOR'S BUS. DAILY,
Jan. 31, 1992, at 8. See also Jinny St. Coar, Hybrid Security Comes to Life: O-Coupon Convertibles Soar,
CORP. CASHFLOW, Sept. 1991, at 47.
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Several newer and more exotic hybrid debt-equity instruments demonstrate
the ease with which issuers can fashion instruments responsive to the capital
market demands that proportionate liability would generate. For example, Liquid
Yield Option Notes, or LYON's, 78 are zero-coupon bonds convertible into the
equity of either the issuer or an affiliate of the issuer.79 These instruments are
particularly attractive to tax exempt institutional investors, who need not
recognize original issue discount interest as it accrues and who may therefore
be particularly attracted to LYON-like instruments with strong equity compo-
nents.80 Corporations could also raise capital by selling exchangeable debt
having a value linked to the price of a different issuer or to the price of an index
of equity shares. In such exchangeable debt offerings, Corporation A sells debt
whose value depends on the price of Corporation B's shares81 or on the value
of a stock index such as the Standard & Poor's 500.82 To the extent that these
instruments are "cash settled" and never actually result in the receipt of an equity
interest in any issuer, a corporation can raise capital by offering an equity-like
risk without exposing investors to even the most remote danger of a propor-
tionate liability judgment.
Corporations can also raise capital without subjecting investors to the risk
of proportionate liability by selling warrants, subscription rights, and other
instruments that give investors the right, but not the obligation, to purchase the
issuer's shares in return for the payment of an exercise price.83 Warrant holders
are not equity holders, cannot vote in elections for the corporation's board, are
not owed fiduciary duties by the corporation's board, and have none of the other
incidents of shareownership.' Warrant holders are, instead, contractual
claimants, and until they exercise the warrants' conversion-like features, they
are not equity holders in the issuer.85
78. Liquid Yield Option Note is a trademark of Merrill Lynch & Co. Financially identical instruments
are marketed by other underwriters under other trade names.
79. Described more fully, these instruments are "zero coupon, convertible, callable, and puttable" bonds.
John J. McConnell & Eduardo Schwartz, The Origin of LYONs: A Case Study in Financial Innovation, 4
J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 40 (1992).
80. See BORIS I. BrrTIKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS 4.40 to 4.43 (5th ed. 1987) (analyzing original issue discount rules).
81. See, e.g., $389,129,000, Sun Co., Inc., 10 3/4% Subordinated Exchangeable Debentures Due 1006,
Exchangeable for Common Stock of Becton, Dickinson and Co. (Prospectus dated Apr. 10, 1981), reprinted
in WRAY & VEILLEUX, supra note 75, at B-2601.
82. See, e.g., Finnerty, supra note 10, at 32; see also $100,000,000 Salomon Inc. 2% Standard & Poor's
500 Index Notes ("SPIN") Due 1990 (Prospectus dated July 29, 1986) (Prospectus Supplement dated Aug.
21, 1986).
83. SHARPE & ALEXANDER, supra note 65, at 588-89.
84. Under Delaware law, the "option feature of [warrants] does not qualify for the protections that flow
from a fiduciary duty... [because] an option to buy stock in the future does not make one an equitable
stockholder." Glinert v. Wickes Companies, C.A. No. 10407, 1990 WL 34703, at *9 (Del. Ch. Mar. 27,
1990) (citing Gamble v. Penn Valley Crude Oil Corp., 104 A.2d 257,260 (Del. Ch. 1954)), affid, 586 A.2d
1201 (Del. 1990)). See also BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 53, at 536; cf. Simons v. Cogan, 549 A.2d 300
(Del. 1988) (no fiduciary duty to holders of convertible debentures).
85. See Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Panhandle Eastern Corp., 521 A.2d 624, 630 (Del. Ch. 1987)
(holding, by analogy to status of convertible security holders, that board owes no fiduciary duty to purchasers
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Although warrant holders are not equity holders for legal purposes, the value
of their investment can again be made to correlate very closely with the value
of limited liability equity in the issuer. This is particularly easy for warrants
that have low strike prices relative to the current price of the issuer's equity.
These instruments will trade like "deep-in-the-money" call options, and their
value will increase or decrease dollar-for-dollar with the value of traditional
limited liability shares in the issuer.8 6 Put another way, warrant holders can
earn equity-like returns without assuming proportionate liability risks. Thus,
investors will again be able to avoid proportionate liability at a relatively low
cost, and the volume of equity that must be held by remote investors in order
to avoid proportionate liability exposure can be substantially reduced.
III. THE INTERIvEDIARIES' RESPONSE
The market need not rely solely on issuers to adjust their own balance sheets
in response to the threat of proportionate liability. Intermediaries such as
investment banks, commercial banks, and mutual funds can structure myriad
instruments and transactions specifically designed to shield shareholder assets
from proportionate liability claimants. Exchangeable securities are a particularly
easy means by which third parties can synthesize limited liability valuations
for the equity of risky issuers.8 7 Through the use of third party exchangeable
instruments, intermediaries can create situtations in which a "safe" foreign
issuer's debt instrument has a value that is highly contingent on the price of
a "risky" domestic issuer's equity.
For example, Merrill Lynch recently structured a debt instrument issued
by Finnish Export Credit with a value contingent on the price of Intel Corpora-
tion stock.88 Holders of these bonds are doubly protected from any potential
Intel-related proportionate liability risk. First, they are not equity holders in Intel;
they are debt holders in a stranger to Intel. Second, the issuer of this instrument
is a foreign entity, so that even if claimants sought to reach these debt holders,
they would have to address the problem of asserting jurisdiction over lenders
to a foreign entity. Foreign governments have also issued bonds and warrants
of when-issued shares and that such security holders have but "a contractual right to become a stockholder
according to the terms of the governing instrument"), aft'd, 545 A.2d 1171 (Del. 1988).
86. See, e.g., VICTOR BRUDNEY & MARVIN A. CHIRELSTE IN, CORPORATE FINANCE 287-93 (3d ed. 1987).
87. See, e.g., Gregory K. Palm & Donald R. Crawshaw, Recent Developments in Hybrid Instruments
and Privately Issued Warrants, in NEW FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS AND TECHNIQUES 95 (Gregory K. Palm
ed., 1990) (describing, among other instruments, Standard and Poor's Index Notes (SPIN's) that increase
with value of the index, reverse SPIN's that increase if market index declines, and index warrants); see also
Edward D. Kleinbard, Equity Derivative Products: Financial Innovation's Newest Challenge to the Tax System,
69TEx. L. REV. 1319 (1991); Tatiana Pouschine &Thomas Bancroft, Why NotBuy theReal Thing?, FORBES,
Oct. 1, 1990, at 208 (describing Walt Disney Company's issuance of debt convertible into the cash value
of shares in Euro Disney S.A., its 49% owned subsidiary).
88. Tom Pratt, Synthetic Perks Offered in 144A Mart by Merrill, INVESTMENT DEALER'S DIG., Mar.
9, 1992, at 14.
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exchangeable into the value of equity indexes, 9 and they could easily do the
same for risky issuers. The problem of asserting jurisdiction over the holders
of exchangeable bonds issued by foreign sovereigns would be even more difficult
than the problem of asserting jurisdiction over the holders of similar bonds issued
by foreign private entities.90
Intermediaries could also create domestic and foreign holding structures
that would hold risky equity in a manner that insulates beneficial owners from
proportionate liability claims. Consider, for example, a trust whose corpus
consists of shares in a risky issuer's equity. To fund the purchase of those shares,
the trust could sell a series of debt instruments constituting a sequence of
contingent claims on the current market value of the issuer's equity; or the trust
could sell warrants or options constituting a series of contingent claims on future
increases in the value of shares held by the trust. When all is said and done,
no investor holding an instrument issued by such a trust has an equity interest
in either the issuer or the trust. Yet any investor who holds a strip of securities
issued by the trust (i.e., a sequence of bonds and warrants or options that, in
the aggregate, yield a constant proportional claim to the trust's assets) has an
investment with a value equal to that of limited liability equity in the unleveraged
issuer.
The market has already generated analogous vehicles for other purposes.
In the late 1980's, investment banks created pools of high-yield debt and then
issued a series of contingent claims on the value of these pools.91 The most
senior claims were substantially over-collateralized and were AAA rated even
though all the bonds in the pool carried below-investment-grade "junk" ratings.
The most junior claims were riskier than any single bond in the trust's portfolio
and had a value sensitive to even a small number of defaults in the trust's
portfolio of securities. A pool funded with risky equity could utilize essentially
the same structure.
Similarly, Morgan Stanley & Co. has proposed a new security called Short-
Term Equity Participations (STEP's). STEP's represent units in the Technology
Equity Income Trust, a trust that holds a weighted portfolio replicating the
American Stock Exchange's Technology Index. The trust will sell call options
on the shares in its underlying index and invest the premiums earned from those
89. For a description of one such product, see Prospectus of Kingdom of Denmark (Jan 12, 1990)
(issuance of 6,000,000 Nikkei Stock Average (225) put warrants; each warrant entitles holder to sell to
Denmark one-fifth of the value of the Nikkei Stock Average at price equal to $51.63) (copy on file with
author).
90. See supra text accompanying notes 42-45.
91. See William Baldwin, Why You Should Buy JunkNow, FORBES, Apr. 30,1990, at 440; Caren Chesler-
Marsh, Repackaging Junk, INVESTrIENT DEALERS' DIG., Nov. 28, 1988, at 19; John J. Curran, Fewer Jitters
About Junk Bonds, FORTUNE, Apr. 29, 1985, at 337; David Gillen, More Junk Bonds May be Repackaged
as High-Grade Securities, Analysts Say, BOND BUYER, Feb. 22, 1990, at 3; Marcia Parker, Securitization
of Junk Bonds Boosts Appeal, PENSIONS & INVESTMENT AGE, Aug. 8, 1988, at 3.
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options in Treasury instruments.92 Again, none of the unit-holders in this trust
will be equity-holders in the issuers whose securities compose the index. Yet
the return that these unit-holders earn will, nevertheless, track the return offered
by the underlying equity.
Another class of transactions that easily achieves this result relies on the
use of offshore investment vehicles. Consider, for example, an offshore mutual
fund or unit investment trust that specializes in holding shares of risky U.S.
issuers. Domestic investors who purchase shares in this offshore fund will be
extraordinarily difficult for proportionate liability plaintiffs to reach. Plaintiffs
would have to go abroad to attempt to identify the shareholders in the offshore
fund. Foreign courts might not order the disclosure of such information for
purposes of enforcing a proportionate liability judgmente 3 and, even if they
did, U.S. investors intent on avoiding proportionate liability claims could hold
these foreign securities through nominee accounts in secrecy jurisdictions.
Investors who are sufficiently large and sophisticated may not even need the
intermediation of a foreign collective investment vehicle because they simply
could hold their stock directly in foreign accounts that U.S. proportionate liability
judgments could not reach. Thus, even if a risky issuer continues to maintain
a substantial float of plain vanilla equity, the market has mechanisms to reduce
or eliminate the proportionate liability risk associated with holding these shares.
IV. THE PROSPECT FOR REGULATORY RETALIATION
Proponents of proportionate liability are unlikely to accept capital market
arbitrage without a fight. To stem potential avoidance strategies of the sort
described, the traditional response is a series of rules and regulations designed
to close "loopholes" in the new legal regime.94 These new rules and regulations
are intended to prevent large scale avoidance without generating costs in excess
of the regime's purported benefits.
Capital markets have extensive experience with such reactive regulation,
95
which often triggers an escalating cycle in which regulatory initiatives inspire
financial innovations that trigger further regulations that in turn give rise to
92. The net effect of this trust-based "buy-write" strategy is to provide unit-holders with a greater income
stream than would be available from a portfolio of the trust's constituent shares, while simultaneously
providing trust holders with an opportunity to share in a portion of the technology stock portfolio's substantial
growth potential, capped by the possibility that substantial appreciation will be called away by the options
purchasers. Morgan Stanley Plans to Offer Security Tied to Technology Issues, WALL ST. J., Feb. 7, 1992,
at B10. These securities have not yet been issued, due to a decline in the value of the underlying index and
disclosure issues raised by the Securities and Exchange Commission. Tom Pratt, Morgan Loses Schrier and
Lead in 'STEPS' Race, INVESTMENT DEALERS' DIG., June 1, 1992, at 11.
93. See Alexander, supra note 26.
94. See, e.g., Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 13.
95. See Kleinbard, supra note 87 (discussing tax system's difficulties in dealing with derivative market
transactions similar to those analyzed in this Article); Hu, supra note 58 (discussing difficulties that banking
regulators face in dealing with derivative market transactions similar to those analyzed in this Article).
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additional rounds of innovation. At the end of this cycle, the rule books are
thicker, but the capital markets often restructure themselves to block the regula-
tory regimes' goals. Regulatory attempts to prevent capital markets from synthe-
sizing limited liability equilibria will likely meet the same fate.
Proponents of reform have anticipated a small piece of the capital markets'
potential response to proportionate liability. They recognize that corporations
can substitute debt for equity, but optimistically suggest that courts can rechar-
acterize "as constructive equity, ostensible debt financing that served as an
obvious liability shield, thus making the debtholders as well as the shareholders
bear unlimited liability for corporate torts. 97 They also recognize that equity
can be shifted to intermediaries, such as mutual funds or trusts, that have few
assets beyond the shares generating proportionate liability.98 To deal with this
possibility, proponents of reform suggest that the courts simply look through
intermediaries to reach the ultimate beneficial owners of the intermediaries'
shares.99
These two measures are not, however, nearly sufficient to staunch the effects
of capital market arbitrage or to prevent markets from achieving a separating
equilibrium that replicates limited liability. To prevent arbitrage, proponents
of proportionate liability will require a much broader regulatory structure of
truly talmudic proportions that encompasses futures, swaps, and options contracts
as well as pseudo-equity instruments of all sorts, including warrants and
convertible and exchangeable debt. Writing these rules would be an impossible
task, and even if such rules could be crafted, they would not make proportionate
liability a workable alternative to a limited liability regime.
At the most fundamental level, if proponents of proportionate liability
attempt to define futures, swaps, options, and other derivative instruments as
"constructive equity" whose holders are potentially subject to claims for
porportionate liability, they will, ironically enough, recreate informational
problems similar to those that for decades served as the strongest rationale for
limited liability. To calculate proportionate liability exposure, each shareholder
must know the percentage of the total equity float in her portfolio. In a world
without derivative markets, this calculation is trivially easy: a shareholder simply
divides the number of shares she owns by the total number of shares issued and
outstanding. But if derivative instruments are also to be considered as "con-
structive equity," each shareholder's proportionate exposure is forever changing
and, as a practical matter, unknowable because the aggregate open interest in
96. See infra text accompanying notes 111-120 (discussing Interest Equalization Tax as an example
of such a cycle).
97. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 1913. Indeed, these proponents of reform are "confident
that the courts could check the most egregious instances of evasion by treating the suspect securities as
constructive equity." Id. at 1894.
98. Id. at 1910-11.
99. Id.
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futures, swaps, and options contracts is neither fixed nor publicly reported.1"
Indeed, the open interest reflected in these contracts can fluctuate dramatically,
sometimes representing a small percentage of the equity issued by the corporation
and at other times swamping the issuer's actual equity float.101 For example,
if every derivative instrument written on one share of stock is considered
equivalent to one share of constructive equity, the holder of one percent of the
equity issued by a corporation could at most be liable for one percent of the
corporation's exposure-but only if there are no derivative market instruments
in the underlying security. The same shareholder could be liable for only one
half of 1% if the open derivative market interest equals the size of the equity
float, and at other times be liable for one quarter of 1% if the open interest
equals three times the size of the equity float. The size of the shareholder's
proportionate exposure thus depends on the size of the derivative market's open
interest at the point that liability attaches.
In this world, shareholders would be unable to calculate a stable price effect
resulting from proportionate liability because the potential exposure that results
from holding a share depends on the size of the open interest in the derivative
markets, and this figure is unknown. This difficulty effectively recreates an
externality problem similar to one long associated with joint and several liability
because each shareholder's liability again depends on the behavior of other
investors.102 The potential magnitude of this problem is not, however, as large
as it is under joint and several liability because the proportionality rule provides
an upper bound for each shareholder's potential exposure. Nonetheless, the
presence of derivative instruments that could be treated as constructive equity
would certainly make pricing proportionate liability far more difficult than
proponents of the regime suggest.
The difficulty of applying proportionate liability to derivative instruments
does not end here. Derivative instruments do not represent identical exposure
to changes in the value of an issuer's underlying equity. Consider a share of
stock that trades at $100, a one-month option to buy a share of that stock at
a strike price of $130, and a two-year option to buy a share at a strike price
of $80. Each of these instruments is indexed to the value of a single share, but
the value of each differs tremendously depending on several factors, including
the price of the underlying equity. Placing equal amounts of proportionate
liability exposure on each of these options would be inequitable and inefficient
because each represents a very different exposure to changes in the value of
the issuer's equity. Although mathematical formulas are available to convert
each of these options into a leveraged position that is akin to borrowing a sum
100. Though data on open interest in exchange-traded options and futures are publicly reported, over-the-
counter positions in the private market are not disclosed. See Hal Lux, Shaking the Street, INVESTMMENT
DEALER'S DIG., Dec. 16, 1991, at 18.
101. See generally SHARPE & ALEXANDER, supra note 65, at 603.
102. See, e.g., Woodward, supra note 1.
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of money to purchase a particular number of shares, these "hedge ratios" are
sometimes difficult to calculate and are forever changing as market prices and
interest rates change and as the options' time until expiration declines. 0 3
To address these measurement problems in a systematic and consistent
manner, the legal system would have to establish complex equivalence rules
defining the relationship between ownership of a derivative instrument and
potential exposure to proportionate liability. Small mistakes in these legal rules
could have dire consequences for derivative markets on risky securities; in fact,
such mistakes could easily induce an artificial tax on derivative instruments that
might cause them to disappear entirely-at least in domestic markets, where
participants potentially could be tapped for proportionate liability.' °4
In addition, if the rules implementing proportionate liability for derivative
market instruments attempt to convert options and other derivative contracts
into levered share equivalents, simple fairness would require that owners of
hedged equity positions also have their proportionate liability exposure reduced
to the extent of their hedged positions. For example, if an investor is long a
certain number of call options and short an appropriate number of futures
contracts, or short shares in the issuer itself, the investor could be holding a
totally hedged position that neither increases nor decreases in value as the price
of the underlying shares rises or falls. The same mathematical argument allowing
options positions to be converted into share equivalents would call for treating
such an investor as holding no equity-equivalent position in the issuer, regardless
of the number of call options or other long derivative positions she holds.
Followed to its logical conclusion, however, this argument implies that if
a traditional shareholder owns stock in an issuer and is simultaneously short
an appropriate number of futures or options contracts, this investor can also be
perfectly hedged and not have any equity-equivalent exposure. For proportionate
liability purposes, this investor would have to be considered as holding no equity
in the issuer despite her appearance on the corporation's books as a shareholder
and her possession of all the benefits incident to shareholder status. Accordingly,
because of the hedging possibilities available through derivative market trans-
actions, not even shareholders of record necessarily have true economic exposure
to changes in the value of the issuer's shares. Thus, if derivative instruments
and traditional equity are to be treated consistently, it will be necessary to trace
through a vast and intricate web of risk shifting transactions to determine
103. See, e.g., SHARPE & ALEXANDER, supra note 65, at 565-66 ("a nearly risk-free portfolio can be
formed by simultaneously writing one call option and purchasing a number of shares equal to the hedge
ratio"); BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 53, at 499 (explaining derivation of Black-Scholes option pricing
model from observation that the value of an option is equivalent to the value of a leveraged position in
underlying shares); Cox & RUBINSTEIN, supra note 65, at 167 ("an appropriately levered position in stock
will replicate the future returns of a call").
104. See, e.g., Joseph A. Grundfest & John B. Shoven, Adverse Implications of a Securities Transactions
Excise Tax, 6 J. Acc. AUDiTING & FIN. 409 (1991).
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precisely where the equity exposure to the price of an issuer's shares ultimately
resides.
Derivative instruments thereby create a Hobson's choice for proponents of
proportionate liability. These advocates can either ignore derivative market
transactions and allow the capital markets to synthesize away the effects of
limited liability, or attempt to allocate proportionate liability among derivative
market transactions. The former course of action allows arbitrage that freely
avoids exposure to proportionate liability through derivative transactions; the
latter would recreate many of the problems that long served to justify limited
liability, and also generate a complex and essentially unadministrable set of rules
that could drive transactions to foreign markets.
If these problems are not enough to chill proponents of a proportionate
liability regime, it is important to recognize that recharacterizing debt as
constructive equity is not as simple as it seems. The tax law has wrestled
unsuccessfully with the debt-equity distinction for decades,105 and financial
markets have repeatedly resorted to transactions capitalizing on the differential
tax treatment of these two often interchangeable forms of investment. 0 6
105. Congress added § 385 to the Internal Revenue Code as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1969 in
an effort to provide greater certainty and predictability in the characterization of debt and equity. See S.
REP. NO. 552, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 137-38 (1969). All efforts by the Treasury to promulgate regulations
pursuant to this statutory authority have failed and Congress' effort to "pass the definitional buck to the
Treasury proved to be a fiasco." BIrrKER & EUSTICE, supra note 74, at 4-6. "[A]ttempts by the courts and
the Treasury to enforce the debt-equity distinction have failed because the traditional rationale for the
distinction is both impracticable and based upon factually incorrect premises." Adam 0. Emmerich, Comment,
Hybrid Investments and the Debt-Equity Distinction in Corporate Taxation, 52 U. CHL L. REv. 118, 119
(1985). Hansmann and Kraakman suggest that the problem presented by corporate issuances of debt and
equity substitutes should be relatively easy to identify and deal with ex post because "[c]onfronted with
such a blatant evasion tactic, a court need only recharacterize some or all of the equity substitutes as
constructive equity for purposes of pro rata tort liability." Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 13, at 430.
In particular, they suggest that it is easiest to respond to convertible securities because they can be
characterized as constructive equity "whenever those securities appear to have been used to evade tort
liability," id., and that it is possible to treat "debt securities as constructive equity as well," when circumstances
warrant. Id.
This analysis, however, presumes the conclusion. These avoidance (not "evasion") tactics need not
be "blatant." Indeed, adoption of these tactics can serve many legitimate purposes other than "to evade tort
liability," and the incentive effects of proportionate liability can be arbitraged away without resort to extreme
situations of the sort Hansmann and Kraakman assume would be easy to identify. In particular, it will be
trivially easy to generate legitimate rationales for the use of equity substitutes, particularly because the price
effects of proportionate liability will make it cheaper to finance through these vehicles. Corporations will
thus be able to present powerful evidence of rational price incentives to issue equity substitutes, and unless
it is possible to segregate the ex ante price effects of proportionate liability, the recharacterization will not
be easy. It will instead be arbitrary.
The recharacterization problem in the tax arena is, moreover, essentially identical to the recharacterization
problem in the proportionate liability regime. If the problem has proven intractable in the tax context, there
is no reason to believe that it will be any easier to resolve in the proportionate liability context. To reverse
the proposition, if advocates of proportionate liability are confident that they can easily resolve the problem
in the proportionate liability context, they have also achieved quite a breakthrough that revolutionizes tax
treatment of the debt-equity issue.
106. See, e.g., David P. Hariton, The Taxation of Complex Financial Investments, 43 TAX L. REV. 731
(1988); Kleinbard, supra note 87; Emmerich, supra note 105.
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Because distinguishing beween debt and equity has proven impossible for other
purposes, this distinction cannot be relied upon to allocate proportionate liability.
Moreover, to the extent proponents of proportionate liability argue that "truly
opportunistic uses of debt financing to avoid tort liability" are "easily isolated
by the courts,"' 7 these proponents must believe that the courts can, at least
on an ex post basis, determine minimally necessary equity capitalization levels.
These two contentions are necessarily connected because only if debt approaches
some "excessive" level designed to evade proportionate liability can debt
financing be considered opportunistic. t08 These levels cannot be defined
without reference to some minimally acceptable level of equity capitalization.
But if courts, or even legislatures, are able to determine minimally necessary
levels of capitalization, why not just articulate those standards ab initio? Such
a clear statement would remove expensive and unnecessary uncertainty regarding
characterizations of an instrument as debt or equity and would enable issuers
to know the precise amount of insurance coverage they need to protect debt
holders from proportionate liability. Further, this ex ante standard would not
be susceptible to hindsight bias."0 9
Proponents of proportionate liability themselves, however, understand that
setting such levels is fraught with difficulty. Minimum capital levels would tend
to be either overinclusive or underinclusive, and errors in setting those levels
107. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 1913.
108. Hansmann and Kraakman observe that the corporate income tax continues to generate substantial
revenue despite the fact that expanded use of debt financing could decrease corporate tax obligations.
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 13, at 434-35 n.22. From this observation, Hansmarm and Kraakman
suggest that the corporate income tax "actually offers a hopeful prognosis" for proportionate liability. Id.
at 434.
This analogy is, however, inapposite. A decision to increase a corporation's debt-equity ratio does
not merely reduce taxes by creating an interest deduction. It also creates serious agency and monitoring
problems that imply an optimal debt-equity ratio beyond which the firm does not want to increase leverage
despite the tax savings generated by additional debt financing. See, e.g., Hansmann, supra note 35, at 284
(citing Michael Jensen & William Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and
Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976), and Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable
Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J. L & ECON. 297 (1978)). Finns therefore consciously
avoid capital structures that minimize tax burdens, and instead optimize their financial state by balancing
the agency costs of particular debt-equity ratios against the tax and other cash flow benefits. For a detailed
analysis of this optimization process in an international tax context, see MYRON S. SCHOLES & MARK A.
WOLFSON, TAXES AND BusINEss STRATEGY: A GLOBAL PLANNING APPROACH (1992).
In contrast, assuming that assessable and nonassessable shareholders are equally vigilant as shareholder
monitors, there are no agency costs generated by the reallocation of equity among anonymous shareholders,
regardless of their assessability. The market therefore perceives no disincentive from the reallocation of equity
to nonassessable shareholders, but associates real costs with the decision to raise too much capital in the
form of debt rather than equity. The continued payment of corporate income taxes thus sheds no light on
the market's likely response to proportionate liability.
If, however, nonassessable shareholders are less vigilant monitors than assessable shareholders, corporate
monitoring will suffer as an increasing percentage of risky corporations' shares gravitate into the hands of
nonassessable shareholders. This collateral effect of the market's arbitrage activity would constitute another
cost of proportionate liability that would have to be weighed against its purported benefits.
109. "In hindsight, people consistently exaggerate what could have been anticipated in foresight." Baruch
Fischhoff, For Those Condemned to Study the Past: Heuristics and Biases in Hindsight, in DANIEL
KAHMANN ET AL, JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEuRisTIcs AND BIASES 335, 341 (1982).
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would send distortional investment signals throughout the economy. ° Betting
on the ex post mistakes of the judicial system is not obviously superior to living
with the ex ante mistakes of the legislative or regulatory system. Recharacterizing
debt as equity is hardly as straightforward as it seems, and one cannot be
optimistic about the possibility of constructing a regulatory regime that can stem
capital market arbitrage.
V. BROADER IMPLICATIONS OF CAPITAL MARKET ARBITRAGE
The arbitrage that eliminates the price effects of proportionate liability is
hardly unique in the annals of modem finance. Capital markets have a long and
illustrious history of responding in ways that frustrate the best laid plans of even
the most clever and well-intentioned regulators. This established pattern of
regulatory intervention in the capital markets followed by market arbitrage
around the legal regime carries deeper lessons for policymakers. In particular,
the pattern suggests that efforts to modify behavior through regulation of capital
market transactions are generally inferior to efforts at influencing the far less
elastic markets for goods and services.
The Kennedy Administration learned this lesson the hard way. In the early
1960's, officials in the Kennedy Administration were concerned about the U.S.
balance of payments deficit."' To stem the outflow of U.S. capital to foreign
markets offering higher interest rates, the Administration proposed the Interest
Equalization Tax (IET), which placed an excise tax on the purchase of foreign
securities by U.S. taxpayers."' Congress enacted the IET in 1964. It was
designed, among other things, to "make foreign investment less attractive [to
U.S. entities] and to thus discourage foreign borrowing in the United States.""'
This goal proved to be elusive, however, as "money is fungible and financial
institutions are innovative.""' 4
The Department of the Treasury anticipated the development of overseas
foreign-currency-dominated capital markets, but failed to foresee that, in response
to the IET, a substantial volume of dollar-dominated foreign financing would
move offshore into the emerging Eurodollar market."' To secure financing
without having to abide by the IET restrictions, some U.S. multinationals created
foreign finance subsidiaries. These subsidiaries issued Eurodollar securities "guar-
110. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 1927.
111. JAMES P. HAWLEY, DOLLARS & BORDERS: U.S. GOVERNMENT ATTEMPTS TO RESTRICT CAPITAL.
FLows, 1960-1980, at 45-46 (1987).
112. Interest Equalization Tax Act of 1963-64, Pub. L. No. 88-563, 78 Stat. 809 (1964). The tax was
reduced to zero by Exec. Order No. 11,766, 3A C.F.R. 126 (1974). It was repealed by the Tax Reform Act
of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Sta. 1520 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
113. CHARLES J. JOHNSON, JR., CORPORATE FINANCE AND THE SECURITES LAWS 461 (1990).
114. HAWLEY, supra note 111, at 59.
115. Id. at 50.
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anteed by the parent and often convertible into the parent's common stock."
' 16
The U.S. government also failed to anticipate that because the IET taxed foreign
portfolio investments while at the same time imposing no restrictions on foreign
direct investments, 17 it would cause a "large increase in the export of short-
and medium-term capital abroad via the commercial banking systems.11. These
"capital outflows... substituted for sales of securities that were shut off by
the interest equalization tax"1 9 and effectively arbitraged around the intended
effect of the ET. The arbitrage was further facilitated by the presence of large,
offshore, dollar-denominated bank deposits that were not repatriated and that
served as the basis for the burgeoning Eurodollar market.12°
In 1965, to stem the continuing outflow of investment capital, President
Johnson announced the Voluntary Foreign Credit Restraint Program (VFCRP),
an initiative designed to restrain foreign direct investments.121 By 1966, howev-
er, the Council of Economic Advisors concluded that the VFCRP had failed
to achieve its goal.' The Johnson Administration responded by instituting
mandatory direct investment controls through the Foreign Direct Investment
Program (FDIP).IS The FDIP, however, stimulated further growth of the
Eurodollar market,124 which helped destabilize the dollar and thus, ultimately,
116. JOHNSON, supra note 113, at 467.
117. HAWLEY, supra note 111, at 53-54.
118. Id at 59. The net outflow of private investment capital increased from $4.3 billion in 1963 to $6.4
billion in 1964. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS 20 (1965), cited in
HAWLEY, supra note 111, at 63.
119. HAWLEY, supra note 111, at 63 (quoting Evelyn M. Parish, The U.S. Balance of Payments in 1964,
in U.S. DEPART1ENT OF COMMERCE, SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS 16 (1965)). Canada served as another
route through which capital avoided the IET. Because Canada depended on U.S. markets for roughly 20%
of its investment capital, foreign policy considerations led to an exemption for Canadian transactions. Canada,
however, had no capital controls analogous to the lET, and therefore "a significant amount of leakage could
be expected via Canada into Europe. This leak was not plugged by Canadian authorities until 1968, after
considerable pressure from the United States." Id. at 47. In light of current events, it is also intriguing to
observe that the government granted a more modest exemption to Japan because of its then substantial capital
needs. Id.
120. JOHNSON, supra note 113, at 461.
121. Message of the President of the United States to Review the International Balance of Payments
and Our Gold Position, in Balance of Payments 1965: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Banking
and Currency, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1965), cited in HAWLEY, supra note 111, at 65. The VFCRP, which
was administered by the Department of Commerce, did not apply to financial institutions. By the late 1960's,
the Federal Reserve Board, through its power to regulate member banks and in coordination with the
Department of Commerce, informally forced U.S. banks to comply with its overseas lending guidelines in
a manner that rendered the program less than "voluntary." Id. at 69. See generally Revised Guidelines for
Banks and Nonbank Financial Institutions, FED. RESERVE BULL, Jan. 1970, at 11-22.
122. COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS, ANNUAL REPORT, ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 166
(1966) ("[Tlhere was disquieting evidence that plans for direct investment in 1966 remained at a high
level .... ).
123. FDIP was established by Exec. Order No. 11,387,3 C.F.R. 90 (1968), reprinted in 12 U.S.C. app.
§ 95a (1976), under authority granted to the President by the 1917 Trading With the Enemy Act, Ch. 106,
40 Stat. 411 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b) (1976)). See HAWLEY, supra note 111, at 87-107.
124. HAWLEY, supra note I1l, at 106. The Bank for International Settlements estimated that the
Eurocurrency market, of which roughly three-quarters constituted dollar-denominated transactions, grew
from $9 billion in 1964 to $71 billion in 1971. Id. at 112.
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contributed to the collapse of the fixed exchange-rate system 1 -- events that
the capital controls were intended to avoid." The capital controls thus failed
to eliminate trade imbalances or to support the dollar, and had the unintended
consequence of fostering the emergence of an active, well-capitalized Eurodollar
market which today competes with domestic capital markets. The failure of this
initiative was clear by 1974, when the government abolished the lET, VFCRP,
and FDIP.127
Because of relatively simple capital market arbitrage of this sort, the lET,
VFCRP, and FDIP failed dismally in achieving their intended public policy
objectives but succeeded smashingly in stimulating the growth of international
money markets. By closing the New York market to international offerings for
dollars and providing an incentive for U.S. multinationals to "merely shift[] their
capital-raising activities to the overseas markets in Europe, ' '12 these regulatory
restrictions fueled the growth of London as the focal point of a huge Eurodollar
market. Indeed, staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission point to lET
as a turning point in the history of modem international finance-the point at
which domestic U.S. regulation caused much of the international finance business
to migrate offshore.129
Similarly, in the more recent debate regarding a proposed stock transactions
tax, serious Congressional concerns about the ability to enforce such a levy in
highly internationalized markets replete with derivative transactions helped
persuade policymakers of the plan's infeasibility.130 Concern that the tax would
drive transactions offshore and do nothing to reduce turnover in U.S. securities
markets buttressed the conclusion that the tax would fail to achieve its intended
purpose and would instead have a wide range of undesirable side effects.
A proportionate liability regime would, as a practical matter, cause problems
similar to those engendered by the lET and those that led Congress to abandon
125. See Richard M. Nixon, Address to the Nation Outlining a New Economic Policy: "The Challenge
of Peace," 1971 PUB. PAPERS 886, 888 (Aug. 15, 1971) (announcing end of gold standard), citedin Kenneth
W. Dam, From the Gold Clause Cases to the Gold Commission: A Half Century of American Monetary Law,
50 U. CHI. L. REV. 504, 528 (1983).
126. HAWLEY, supra note Ill, at 108-20 (discussing long-term, contradictory consequences of IET,
VFCRP, and FDIP). Hawley argues, among other things, that U.S. transnational banks, by borrowing dollars
offshore, were able to circumvent the restrictive monetary policies the Federal Reserve Board had adopted
in the late 1960's to support the value of the dollar. Furthermore, "[tihe Eurodollar market enabled U.S.
[tiransnational banks] to circumvent the impact of [Federal Reserve Board] Regulation Q's interest-rate ceilings
used to control the credit-creating capacity of the U.S. banking system by routing transactions through their
foreign branches." Id. at 113.
127. Id. at 107.
128. Carl T. Bodolus, The Internationalization of Securities Markets, 29 BUs. LAW. 107, 107 (1974).
129. Id. at 108.
130. See, e.g., CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, REDUCING THE DEFICIT: SPENDING AND REVENUE
OPTIONS, A REPORT TO THE SENATE AND HOUSE COMMITTEES ON THE BUDGET: PART u[ 389 (1990)
(concluding that transactions tax would be most difficult to implement because "[i]t would be difficult for
the IRS to audit [foreign] transactions ... so compliance would probably be low"); Grundfest & Shoven,




securities transactions taxes. The difficulties associated with the IET, stock
transactions tax proposals, and a proportionate liability regime can be explained
by the fact that each of these policies attempts to tax or regulate highly elastic
financial markets that can easily restructure themselves in response to govern-
mental intrusion. In a related vein, Frank Ramsey established more than sixty
years ago that a Pareto efficient tax system would set levies at rates inversely
proportional to the sum of the elasticities of supply and demand in the markets
subject to the tax because that strategy minimizes the deadweight loss caused
by taxation. 131 This finding suggests that markets with relatively elastic supply
and demand schedules should be subject to lower tax rates and less regulatory
intervention, whereas markets with relatively inelastic supply and demand
schedules can optimally be subject to higher tax rates and greater regulatory
intervention.
Capital markets have among the highest degrees of elasticity of supply and
demand. On the demand side, investors can readily shift from one security to
another and can easily transfer assets across international borders to tap offshore
opportunities. On the supply side, investment bankers, commercial bankers,
exchanges, and other intermediaries all stand ready to introduce new financial
instruments and transaction techniques to satisfy investor demands. In light of
the mobility, innovation and competition apparent in the world's capital markets,
it is difficult to identify a market that is more elastic.
The markets for goods and services are, in contrast, not nearly so elastic.
In the context of selecting a corporate liability rule, if the choice is between
regulating the hazardous activity in which the corporation engages or regulating
the capital structure of the corporation itself, the lesson is clear: Regulate the
activity and not the capital flow. Thus, if society is concerned that a chemical
manufacturer is undercapitalized or is engaging in unreasonably hazardous
activity, it is more effective to regulate the manufacturing process itself or the
market for the chemical than it is to tamper with the far more elastic market
for the capital that funds this hazardous enterprise.
This Article represents a case-specific manifestation of this more general
principle. In order to achieve the internalization of risk sought through a
proportionate liability system, architects of the regime will inevitably be driven
to broaden the base of transactions subject to proportionate liability because the
high degree of elasticity in capital markets will force them to chase a dizzying
array of sophisticated market responses. In contrast, by directly regulating the
less elastic markets for the production or consumption of the goods and services
that give rise to concern, regulations will have to chase fewer market responses
and can achieve the regulators' desired outcomes at lower social cost.
131. See Frank P. Ramsey, A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation, 37 ECON. J. 47 (1927); JOSEPH
E. STIGLrrz, ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR 403-04 (1st ed. 1986). This analysis depends on a number
of assumptions, including the fact that lump-sum taxes are infeasible. STIGLrz, supra, at 403.
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CONCLUSION
Limited shareholder liability certainly has its theoretical flaws. It is not a
thing of perfect beauty, but at least it works. In contrast, proportionate liability
has theoretical charms, but nevertheless is not a practical alternative to limited
liability-at least for corporations with liquid, actively traded equity. Because
modem capital markets can readily arbitrage around the price effects of propor-
tionate liability to synthesize limited liability pricing, a shift to proportionate
liability will simply impose additional transaction costs on investors and issuers
alike. This game is not worth the candle.
To view the corporate liability debate in a fuller perspective, it is important
to recognize that the trend is toward increased reliance on limited liability.
Lloyd's of London, long the paradigmatic example of an institution that relied
on unlimited liability, has recently announced plans to limit the liability of its
"names," the investors who stand at risk in underwriting Lloyd's insurance
policies. 32 Accountants and attorneys who have long been personally liable
to the full extent of their fortunes for their own and their partners' negligence
are now pushing for limitations on their personal exposure. 133 States are also
creating new forms of business organizations designed to combine the limited
liability characteristics of corporations with the pass-through characteristics of
partnerships." Only academia seems to be running in the opposite direction.
132. The liability of Lloyd's names is, in many ways, similar to that which would be imposed under
a proportionate liability regime. "Names have unlimited personal liability for their respective share of [an
underwriting syndicate's] risk" but a name has "no responsibility whatsoever for the liability of his fellow
syndicate members." Roby v. The Corp. of Lloyds, [Current Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) q 96,825,
at 93,290 (S.D.N.Y. June 12, 1992). Recent financial losses at Lloyd's have nonetheless given rise to several
proposals for providing names with limited liability protection. See G. Bruce Knecht, Beleaguered Lloyd's:
Famed British Insurer is Fightingfor Survival, BARRON's, June 1, 1992, at 15 ("Unlimited liability-histori-
cally one of the organization's chief attractions for clients-probably will become a relic of the past."); John
Moore, Posgate Calls for End to Lloyd's Principle of Unlimited Liability, INDEPENDENT, Sept. 24, 1991,
at 22 ("Uoyd's and its underwriting members have been hit by more than one billion pounds of losses and
an internal task force is considering whether unlimited liability is an appropriate mechanism to underpin
Lloyd's insurance policies."); New Turmoil atLloyd's, UPI, Feb. 24, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
UPI File ("Last year's losses prompted calls for Lloyd's to abandon its unique practices, such as the time-
honored rule that all its individual investors have unlimited liability to pay claims.").
133. See, e.g., AICPA Members Okay Proposal to Permit CPA Firms to Organize as Corporations,
24 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 109 (Jan. 24, 1992); Lee Berton & Joann S. Lublin, Seeking Shelter:
Partnership Structure Is Called in Question as Liability Risk Rises, WALL ST. J., June 10, 1992, at Al; see
generally Stephen A. Kalish, Lawyer Liability and Incorporation of the Law Firm: A Compromise Model
Providing Lawyer-Owners with Limited Liability and Imposing Broad Vicarious Liability on Some Lanyer-
Employees, 29 ARIZ. L. REV. 563 (1987) (recommending that lawyer-owners be permitted to limit their
liability by incorporation and that lawyer-employees be treated as if they were sole practitioners engaged
in the practice of law); Larry E. Ribstein, The Deregulation ofLimited Liability and the Death of Partnership,
70 WASH. U. L.Q. 417,423 (1992) (suggesting that unlimited liability in partnership form "has been preserved
by legal rules that make limited liability costly, including the tax distinction between partnership and
corporation," and projecting trend toward limited liability).
134. See David G. Dietze, The LimitedLiability Company: Latest Strategy andDevelopments 6 INsiGHrs
3 (1992); Thomas Earl Geo, Understanding the Limited Liability Company: A Basic Comparative Primer,
37 S.D. L. REV. 64 (1992); R. Bruce Johnson & Steven W. Bennett, Limited Liability Companies Introduced
in Many States, J. MULTISTATE TAX'N 105 (1991); Brian L. Schorr & Aileen R. Leventon, Limited Liability
Company: An Alternative Business Form, N.Y. L., May 30, 1991, at 1.
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Whether and how to deal with the shortcomings of limited liability are
therefore questions that deserve to be addressed from a broader perspective. For
all the academic controversy, the evidence is hardly overwhelming that limited
liability causes a significant increase in a corporation's willingness to engage
in risky behavior. 35 If limited liability causes such a problem, and if the mag-
nitude of the problem makes an extensive remedy worthwhile, then alternatives
other than proportionate liability must be considered because proportionate
liability cannot succeed in the face of extensive capital market arbitrage. The
three leading alternatives to changes in shareholder liability rules are minimum
capitalization requirements, product safety standards, and "gatekeeper" liability
provisions.
Minimum capitalization requirements establish levels of equity capital or
insurance that enterprises must maintain in order to conduct certain lines of
business. If an enterprise has the necessary capitalization or insurance coverage,
the social and political judgment is that the enterprise has sufficient wealth at
risk to ensure that it will behave responsibly in regulating its own activities.
Minimum capitalization requirements have become the backbone of bank
regulatory strategies,136 and states often impose minimum insurance and other
requirements as preconditions for engaging in certain lines of business.137 On
the other hand, these requirements have obvious administrative problems. The
legislative and regulatory processes are likely to misestimate appropriate levels
of capitalization and lag behind new market and technological data that might
suggest adjustments to capitalization requirements. 3 ' To the extent that
legislators and regulators "guess wrong" and set capitalization levels too high
or too low, they will no doubt induce distortions in the market. Despite these
obvious flaws, minimum capitalization requirements have the virtue of being
effective. They can be applied equitably to domestic and foreign corporations,
as well as to publicly traded and privately held firms. They cannot be arbitraged
away because they are applied directly to markets for goods and services and
135. Hansmann and Kraakrnan recognize this point but argue that it is misleading to rely on the past
incidence of corporate bankruptcies resulting from tort liability as an indicator of the extent to which limited
liability induces excessive risk-taking, or as a predictor of the extent to which limited liability may be
perceived as a problem in the future. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note I, at 1880-81.
136. See, e.g., Capital Adequacy Guidelines for Bank Holding Companies: Risk-Based Measure (Reg.
Y), 12 C.F.R. § 225, App. A (1992); Camille M. Caesar, Note, Capital-Based Regulation and US. Banking
Reform, 101 YALE LJ. 1525 (1992).
137. E.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7549.1 (West 1992) (private security patrol operators); CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1597.531 (West 1992) (day care home operation); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 12,106 (West 1992) (use of high explosives). Sometimes, however, the government caps the maximum
size of potential recoveries from providers of certain goods or services. See, e.g., Price-Anderson Act, codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1982) (limiting liability from nuclear accidents), cited in James H.
Davenport, The Law of High-Level Nuclear Waste, 53 TENN. L. REV. 481, 522-23 n.296 (1986); Daryl L.
Jones, Note, Fein v. Permanente Medical Group: The Supreme Court Uncaps the Constitutionality of Statutory
Limitations on Medical Malpractice Recoveries, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1075 (1986); Nancy L. Manzer, Note,1986 Tort Reform Legislation: A Systematic Evaluation of Caps on Damages and Limitations on Joint and
SeveralLiability, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 628 (1988) (discussing, inter alia, medical malpractice liability caps).
138. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 1927-28.
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have their effect before the capital markets even define securities based on cash
flows generated by these goods and services.
Product safety standards play a similar role. By defining safety standards,
regulators can reduce the risk of events that threaten to generate liability in
excess of corporate assets. These standards cannot be avoided through capital
market activity because, regardless of financial arbitrage, the market for goods
and services-which is, after all, where torts occur-remains subject to these
safety standards. Although the inefficiencies of product safety standards are
legion and regulators inevitably make mistakes in setting such standards, 39
they can be enforced and do affect the standard of care followed by a corpora-
tion.
"Gatekeeper" strategies impose personal, civil, or criminal penalties on
corporate decisionmakers and advisers who play a role in events leading up to
the corporation's involvement in a tort or crime."4 Again, no capital market
arbitrage can hedge away an individual executive's exposure, and liability can
be avoided only through the exercise of greater care in the market for goods
and services. Gatekeeper liability is becoming increasingly popular as a strategy
for dealing with troublesome corporate conduct: recent California legislation
makes certain corporate officials criminally liable for some corporate torts;141
federal securities laws hold management liable for failure to supervise employees
who violate securities regulations; 42 and federal corporate sentencing guide-
lines provide an incentive for corporations to monitor their own compliance with
a wide range of legal and regulatory requirements. 43 The concept is also
applied abroad, as illustrated by India's attempts to impose criminal gatekeeper
139. See, e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 281-82 (1987); W. KIP
VIscusi, RISK BY CHOICE-REGULATING HEALTH AND SAFETY IN THE WORKPLACE 114-55 (1983); John
E. Calfee & Richard Crasweil, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal Standards, 70 VA.
L. REV. 965 (1984); Thomas J. Kniesner & John D. Leeth, Improving Workplace Safety: Standards or
Insurance? REGULATION, Fall 1991, at 64, 64-68.
140. See, e.g., Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: TheAnatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy,
2 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 53 (1986); see also Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs
of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857 (1984) (discussing executive liability); A. MITCHELL POLINSKY &
STEVEN SHAVELL, SHOULD EMPLOYEES BE SUBJECT TO FINES AND IMPRISONMENT GIVEN THE EXISTENCE
OF CORPORATE LIABILITY? (John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics, Stanford Law School, Working
Paper No. 86, 1992) (demonstrating that employee sanctions may be beneficial); cf. RONALD J. GILSON,
THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 1095-137 (1986) (discussing successor liability in
corporate acquisitions).
141. Corporate Criminal Liability Act, CAL. PENAL CODE § 387 (West 1992) (corporate managers who
fail to disclose certain potential hazards are subject to imprisonment for up to three years and fines of up
to $25,000).
142. See, e.g., Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564 (9th Cir. 1990); Davis v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 906 F.2d 1206 (8th Cir. 1990).
143. U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 8A1.2-EI.3 (1992)
(dealing with sentencing of organizations). See also Gary G. Lynch & Susan L. Merrill, Enforcement in
the 1990s: The Corporate Response-The United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines, in PRACTICING
LAW INSTITUTE, 23RD ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION (1991); Jonathan R. Macey, Agency
Theory and the CriminalLiability ofOrganizations, 71 B.U.L. REV. 315 (1991); Christopher A. Wray, Note,
Corporate Probation Under the New Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, 101 YALE L.J. 2017 (1992).
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liability on the most senior executive of Union Carbide in connection with the
Bhopal chemical leak.144
Further, because minimum capitalization requirements, safety standards, and
gatekeeper liability obligations can be applied equally to all corporations-whe-
ther large or small, public or private, domestic or foreign-they do not generate
artificial incentives to operate businesses in one form or jurisdiction over
another.145 This consideration is particularly important from the perspective
of international product markets1" because, as powerful as capital market
arbitrage may be, its consequences could pale in comparison with the product
market substitutions possible in many markets. If proportionate liability (or any
other liability regime) differentially raises the capital or production costs of
output manufactured by corporations chartered in the U.S., consumers may flock
to lower priced foreign substitutes and thereby drive U.S. chartered producers
from the market. To address this contingency, proportionate liability legislation
would have to impose some sort of equalizing tax or regulatory burden on goods
and services produced by foreign chartered entities. The imposition of these
burdens undoubtedly would be highly controversial and lead to yet another set
of distortions and trade frictions as regulators attempt to level the international
economic playing field. Thus, by focusing solely on capital market mechanisms
that can negate the intended effects of proportionate liability, this Article
understates the practical problems that a proportionate liability regime is certain
to encounter.
This Article's analysis will, no doubt, inspire proponents of proportionate
liability to amass additional rules and regulations designed to prevent capital
and product market arbitrage around the rule. 47 It is impossible to anticipate
the precise contours of each of these efforts to defend proportionate liability.
As already suggested, however, capital markets will often be able to respond
to these regulatory initiatives with new financial innovations,'"8 and these
proposed regulatory initiatives may raise new legal and practical difficulties even
144. Bhopal Court Begins Extradition of U.S. Businessman Accused in 1984 Gas Leak, INT'L ENV'T
DAILY (BNA), Apr. 1, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BNA Int'l Env't Daily File; Extradition
Bid on Bhopal, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28,1992, at 40; Union Carbide Official NotLikely to be Extradited, AGENCE
FRANCE PRESSE, Mar. 28, 1992, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Agence France Presse File.
145. Though the analysis in this Article is specifically limited to corporations with liquid markets that
can support active arbitrage transactions in their equity shares, the analysis also has implications for the
treatment of shareholders in close corporations with illiquid equity. To the extent that risky economic activity
can be pursued by corporations with liquid or illiquid shares, adoption of a proportionate liability rule creates
an artificial incentive toward liquid equity because liquid equity facilitates arbitrage that avoids liability.
A proportionate liability regime will therefore artificially and inefficiently induce the migration of risky
economic activity from close corporations to publicly traded corporations, and this distortionary bias is yet
another reason to retain traditional limited liability rules.
146. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 1922-23.
147. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 13, is typical of this effort.
148. See supra Part IV.
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more profound than those created by the proportionate liability rule that they
were designed to defend. 149
The inescapable implication of this analysis is clear: there is no simple
proportionate liability rule. An enforceable proportionate liability rule would
have to be adopted in conjunction with extensive and detailed rules governing
international investments as well as the manufacture and importation of goods
and services produced by corporations chartered in foreign jurisdictions with
limited liability regimes. In addition, proportionate liability would require a
heretofore undiscovered jurisprudence capable of distinguishing nonassessable
debt from assessable equity. It would also have to be supported by a procedural
armamentarium designed to maximize the reach of U.S. courts while minimizing
the costs of enforcement. Even then, this Article suggests that the regime would
likely fail.
Despite its flaws, limited liability may therefore be a necessary evil.
Corporations undoubtedly engage in risky behavior that can cause damage in
excess of their ability to pay. It does not, however, automatically follow that
149. Hansmann and Kraakman suggest that the problem of foreign nonassessable shareholders can be
addressed by requiring a substantial percentage of all shareholders of U.S. firms in risky industries to be
"(a) U.S. residents, (b) institutional shareholders with substantial (or, equivalently, well-diversified) assets
in the U.S., or (c) individuals or well-capitalized institutional investors" that are foreign but that consent
to U.S. jurisdiction for purposes of proportionate liability judgments. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note
13, at 433. If a firm's shareholders fail to satisfy these conditions, the firm could be subject to mandatory
insurance requirements.
This proposal raises three distinct problems. It may violate the principle of "national treatment," which,
as articulated in many U.S. bilateral treaties of friendship, commerce and navigation, requires that foreign
enterprises be afforded treatment "no less favorable than the treatment accorded... in like situations, to
nationals, companies [or] products ... as the case may be" of the United States. U.S. DEPARTMENT op THE
TREASURY, NATIONAL TREATMENT STuDY 30 (1990) (emphasis added). Under Hansmann and Kraakman's
proposal, any corporation with "too many" foreign shareholders would be confronted with insurance
requirements or other restrictions on its business that would not be imposed on corporations with "all-
American" shareholder populations, regardless of the evidence of the domestic firm's capitalization, or of
the capitalization of its shareholders. Hansmann and Kraakman's proposal thus differentially burdens firms
that rely on foreign capital and runs counter to the historical position of the U.S. as "a strong advocate of
national treatment and the free international movement of goods, services, and capital." Id. at 5.
In addition, to the extent that U.S. residents are permitted to hold shares without triggering any adverse
consequences, regardless of their net worth, it would be trivially easy for foreigners to establish U.S.
investment vehicles that are capitalized with assets sufficient only to purchase risky shares, but not to pay
out any proportionate liability claims. To restrict this easy avoidance of the proposed rules, and to provide
national treatment, Hansmann and Kraakman would have to require that at least a certain percentage of
shareholders, regardless of their domicile, have assets sufficient to cover potential proportionate liability
claims, or that the corporation itself have adequate assets or insurance.
If that requirement is imposed at the corporate level, it devolves into a straightforward minimum
capitalization requirement. If it is imposed at the shareholder level, a third set of problems arises because
minimum capitalization requirements imposed on shareholders are less efficient and less practical than
minimum capitalization requirements imposed on corporations themselves. Shareholder capitalization require-
ments are clearly more expensive to administer because they require that the assets of potentially millions
of shareholders be tracked or verified. Such requirements can also lead to inefficient risk bearing because
they can preclude certain investors from holding shares even if their inclusion does not diminish the
enterprises' aggregate ability to satisfy a tort judgment.
It is thus far from clear that Hansmann and Kraakman's attempt to staunch international mechanisms
of arbitrage by imposing special requirements on firms having too many foreign shareholders would be
practical, efficient, or consistent with U.S. treaty obligations.
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the most practical and prudent course of action is to make a corporation's
shareholders liable for damages resulting from corporate conduct. Capital markets
can easily arbitrage around these liabilities and can synthesize limited liability
pricing in a proportionate liability world. Indeed, capital markets can synthesize
limited liability pricing in response to any regime that seeks to hold shareholders
responsible for corporate damages. Under these circumstances, policymakers
must look elsewhere for solutions to the problems purportedly created by limited
liability.5 0 Tools that are not susceptible to arbitrage, such as minimum capital-
ization requirements, product safety standards, and gatekeeper liability strategies
may be more promising.151
Rather than concluding that "the burden is now on the proponents of limited
liability to justify the prevailing rule,' '152 it seems that the burden is on propo-
nents of proportionate liability to demonstrate that their scheme is a viable
alternative, much less a preferable one. More broadly, the burden is on opponents
of limited liability to demonstrate that there is any practical alternative liability
regime that cannot be avoided through capital market arbitrage and does not
raise insurmountable implementation problems in international capital and product
markets. Viewed from this perspective, limited liability may well be a necessary
consequence of trading in modem capital markets rather than a discretionary
rule that can be abandoned by the legal system if some other doctrine seems
preferable.
150. The simple observation that a corporation can cause damage in excess of its ability to pay does
not mean that the corporation causes damage because of its limited obligation to pay. The arguments
suggesting that limited liability is a material factor in corporate risk bearing activities is impressionistic and
depends on projections about future trends that may or may not turn out to be accurate. See, e.g., Hansmann
& Kraakman, supra note 1, at 1880-81.
151. Upon closer examination, policymakers may conclude that each of these alternatives generates
costs in excess of benefits and that as uncomfortable as the status quo seems, it may be the best of all
practically attainable worlds.
152. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 1880.
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